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Article 
Actors as Authors in American Copyright Law 
JUSTIN HUGHES 
Among the many kinds of works eligible for copyright protection, 
audiovisual works are arguably the most complex, involving screenwriters, 
directors, actors, cinematographers, producers, set designers, costume 
designers, lighting technicians, etc. Some countries expressly recognize 
which categories of these contributors are entitled to legal protection, but 
American copyright law does not. Because the complex relationships among 
these creative professionals are usually governed by contract, there is 
relatively little case law on issues of authorship in audiovisual works. This 
is especially true on the question of dramatic performers as authors of 
audiovisual works. 
This Article provides the first in-depth exploration of whether, when, 
and how actors are authors under American copyright law. After describing 
how case law, government views, and scholarly commentary support the 
conclusion that actors are authors, the Article analyzes the strange—and 
strangely inconclusive—2015 Garcia v. Google litigation. The Article then 
uses some simple thought experiments to establish how dramatic performers 
generally meet both the Constitutional and statutory standard for 
“authorship.” Finally, the Article reviews the various filters that prevent 
actors-as-authors legal struggles and how, when all else fails, we can 
consider actors as joint authors of the audiovisual works embodying their 
dramatic performances. 
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 Actors as Authors in American Copyright Law 
JUSTIN HUGHES * 
INTRODUCTION  
There are many familiar, deep-seated disagreements in intellectual 
property law—for example, varied points of view on exhaustion of rights, 
the scope of patentable subject matter in the United States, or whether the 
right of distribution in American copyright law encompasses “making 
available.”1 But occasionally, there are places in the intellectual property 
landscape that hold unexpected—and unexplored—uncertainty. The 
protection of dramatic performances under American copyright law seems 
to be one of those areas. What one commentator noted in 2001 remains true 
today: “There is little case law or statutory authority as to the position of 
performers as authors of an audiovisual work under U.S. law.”2 The question 
is simple: under American copyright law can an actor be an author of the 
audiovisual works in which he or she performs? 
Reviewing the few points of law and commentary on the question and 
placing American copyright in the larger framework of international 
intellectual property norms, this Article reasons that actors must be 
“authors” under American copyright law—any other conclusion would be 
counter to basic principles of American copyright law.  
Part I of this Article reviews the framework of international legal norms 
in which American copyright law exists, setting out how actors may be 
“authors” as international copyright law understands that concept. Part II 
then takes up the glimmers of law and commentary that address whether and 
how dramatic performances attract copyright protection under American 
copyright law. This evidence has been limited, but has consistently pointed 
toward the conclusion that actors can be authors under American copyright 
law. Part II also explores what happened on the actors-as-authors question 
                                                                                                            
* Honorable William Matthew Byrne, Jr. Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount 
University. My thanks to Robert Brauneis, Jay Dougherty, Kevin Collins, Jane Ginsburg, Paul Goldstein, 
Jukka Liedes, Jessica Litman, Shira Perlmutter, and Robert Stoll for their helpful comments. Thanks to 
William Bowen and Claudia Herrera for research assistance. The remaining errors are the exclusive 
intellectual property of the author. Copyright © 2018 by the author. Permission is hereby granted for 
noncommercial reproduction of this Article in whole or in part for educational or research purposes, 
including the making of multiple copies for classroom use, subject only to the condition that the name of 
the author, a complete citation to Connecticut Law Review, and this copyright notice and grant of 
permission be included in the copies. 
1 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., THE MAKING AVAILABLE RIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2016). 
2  F. Jay Dougherty, Not A Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. 
Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 300 (2001). 
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in the 2015 Garcia v. Google decision, a litigation tale more of fraud and 
fatwas than clear conclusions on copyright law. With Garcia v. Google 
properly understood, Part III returns to the basic question and explores 
whether and how dramatic performances attract copyright protection 
through hypotheticals and views of the acting community. After a brief 
review of the legal and customary filters that keep parties from litigating the 
actor-as-author question, Part IV offers a discussion of joint authorship 
doctrine as it should apply to actors in audiovisual works. 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
American copyright law sits in the broader context of the international 
copyright system and the international legal norms in intellectual property 
to which the United States has agreed to be bound. Among the many 
international treaties in intellectual property, three pertain to the rights of 
dramatic performers in their performances.  
A. The Open-Ended Framework of the Berne Convention 
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works3 
has been the central pillar of the international copyright system since at least 
1988, when the United States finally ratified the Convention and effectively 
ended competition between Berne and the Universal Copyright Convention 
administered by UNESCO.4 Films were first included in Berne during the 
1908 Berlin revision of the Convention, when it was agreed that 
cinematographic works were to be treated as “literary or artistic works when 
by the arrangement of the stage effects or by the combination of the incidents 
represented, the author shall have given to the work a personal and original 
character.”5 The position of audiovisual works in the Berne Convention was 
strengthened in 1967 with the addition of Article 14bis which provides that: 
(1) Without prejudice to the copyright in any work which may 
have been adapted or reproduced, a cinematographic work 
                                                                                                            
3  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at 
Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
4  For background, see Leonard D. Duboff, et al., Out of UNESCO and into Berne: Has United 
States Participation in the Berne Convention for International Copyright Protection Become Essential?, 
4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 203, 213 (1985). See also Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late than Never: 
Implementation of the 1886 Berne Convention, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 176 (1989). 
5 Convention Creating an International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
signed at Berlin, November 13, 1908, Art. 14, as reprinted in Library of Congress, Report of the Delegate 
of the United States to the International Convention for the Revision of the Berne Copyright Convention 
Held at Berlin, Germany, October 14 to November 14, 1908, Copyright Office Bulletin, No. 13 at 21 
(1908) [hereinafter 1908 BERNE REVISION OF BERNE]. 
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shall be protected as an original work. The owner of copyright 
in a cinematographic work shall enjoy the same rights as the 
author of an original work, including the rights referred to in 
the preceding Article.  
(2)(a) Ownership of copyright in a cinematographic work shall 
be a matter for legislation in the country where protection is 
claimed.6  
Article 14bis further provides a limited mechanism to consolidate the 
rights of different contributors to an audiovisual work by providing that “in 
the absence of any contrary or special stipulation” a contributor may not 
object to the reproduction, distribution, public performance, or other 
exploitation of the work.7 Article 14bis exempts from this mandatory 
presumptive consolidation of economic rights the “principal director” as 
well as the “authors of scenarios, dialogues and musical works created for 
the making of the cinematographic work.”8  
These elements suggest that the negotiators may have envisioned the 
film director as the principal author, i.e. the originality is recognized in the 
“arrangement of the stage effects” and “the combination of the incidents 
represented” (although the former phrase could be interpreted other ways).9 
By 1967 a film’s screenwriter and the composer of the soundtrack (the latter 
not existing in 1908) seemed to have been placed on par or potential par with 
the director. No mention is made of dramatic performers, meaning that if 
dramatic performers are authors of cinematographic works, they would be 
subject to the Article 14bis(2)(b) presumptive consolidation of economic 
rights. 
Many jurisdictions also designate potential types of authors of 
audiovisual works. For example, France’s Intellectual Property Code 
presumes that authors of an audiovisual work include the director, the author 
of the script, the author of any adaptation, any separate author(s) of dialogue, 
and composers of musical compositions created especially for the film.10 
                                                                                                            
6  Berne Convention, supra note 3, at art. 14bis. 
7 Id. at art. 14bis(2)(b) (“[I]n the countries of the [Berne] Union which, by legislation, include 
among the owners of copyright in a cinematographic work authors who have brought contributions to 
the making of the work, such authors, if they have undertaken to bring such contributions, may not, in 
the absence of any contrary or special stipulation, object to the reproduction, distribution, public 
performance, communication to the public by wire, broadcasting or any other communication to the 
public, or to the subtitling or dubbing of texts, of the work.”). 
8  See id. at art. 14bis(3) (noting that a Berne Convention country is still permitted to have a 
presumption of consolidation of economic rights from these types of authors). 
9 1908 BERNE REVISION OF BERNE, supra note 5. The French original for “stage effects” is “mise 
en scène,” a far richer concept than carried by the English words. 
10 CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.I.P.] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] art. L113-
7 (Fr.), available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/location/1742. 
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German and Mexican law have similar provisions.11 China’s Copyright Law 
of 2010 stipulates that ownership of a cinematographic work belongs to the 
“the producer of the work” but then specifies that the authors of a 
cinematographic work are its “scriptwriter, director, cameraman, lyricist, 
composer, and other authors,”12 presumably ensuring that those individuals 
enjoy the moral rights associated with the work under Chinese law.13  
But the fact that neither the Berne Convention nor these other 
jurisdictions mention actors as authors has little bearing on the question for 
American copyright law. Indeed, the closest thing to an official commentary 
on Berne Article 14bis recognizes that actors may be among the authors of 
a cinematographic work. The 1978 World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection and Literary and 
Artistic Works14 says that Article 14bis intends to draw a distinction between 
the “principal director” along with contributors to a cinematographic work 
“whose works (scenarios, scripts, music) can enjoy an existence other than 
in the film itself” versus all other contributors to whom the presumption 
applies.15 The 1978 WIPO Guide describes those other contributors as 
“assistant producers and directors, those responsible for decor, costumiers, 
cameramen and cutters, and also to the actors, to the extent that some 
countries treat them as co-authors of the film.”16  
The 1978 WIPO Guide is worded this way because most national laws 
protecting dramatic performers do so through separate “neighboring 
rights.”17 Simply put, these countries acknowledge the creative contribution 
                                                                                                            
11 Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [Copyright 
Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl I at art. 65 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html#p0688 (providing that in the case of jointly authored 
works, “[c]opyright in cinematographic works and works produced in a manner similar to 
cinematographic works expires 70 years after the death of the last surviving of the following person: the 
principle film director, the author of the screenplay, the author of the dialogues, the composer of music 
specifically composed for use in the cinematographic work in question.”); Ley Federal del Derecho de 
Autor [LDFA], art. 97, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1996 (Mex.) [hereinafter LDFA], 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mx/mx003en.pdf. 
12 Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, (promulgated by Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress on Amending Copyright Law, Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991) 
[hereinafter 2010 Copyright Law of China], art. 15, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn031en.pdf. 
13 See id. at art. 10 (establishing rights of attribution and integrity); Seagull Haiyan Song, China’s 
Copyright Protection for Audio-Visual Works – Comparison with Europe and the U.S., 46 INT’L REV. 
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 410, 410–13 (2015) (comparing the Chinese, European, and United 
States models of copyright protection for films). 
14 Claude Masouyé, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971), [WIPO] (1978), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/615/wipo_pub_615.pdf [hereinafter Masouyé].  
15 Masouyé, supra note 14, ¶ 14bis14 at 89. 
16 Id. ¶ 14bis15 at 89 (emphasis added). 
17 E.g., LDFA, supra note 11, at arts. 116–22; 2010 Copyright Law of China, supra note 12, at art. 
37.  
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of dramatic performers with a different form of intellectual property rights. 
In contrast, Canadian law provides a good example of a country that—per 
the WIPO Guide—expressly provides copyright to audiovisual performers 
for their performances. Section 2 of the Copyright Act of Canada defines a 
“performer’s performance” in a way that includes performance of a 
“dramatic work” and a “recitation or reading of a literary work”—even when 
the underlying works are out of copyright.18 The Section 2 definition also 
includes “an improvisation of a dramatic work . . . whether or not the 
improvised work is based on a pre-existing work.”19 Among the provisions 
extending copyright to “performer’s performances,” Section 15(2) restricts 
some rights stemming from audiovisual performances to those performances 
that “take place in Canada or in a Rome Convention country” while section 
15(2.1) restricts other rights to performances that “take place in Canada.”20 
But these elaborate provisions—and the narrower scope of audiovisual 
performers’ copyright—reflect Canada’s current international obligation 
under the Rome Convention and not a basic questioning of the notion that 
actors’ dramatic performances may be protected under copyright.  
B. From the 1961 Rome Convention to the 2012 Beijing Treaty 
Separate from the Berne Convention, there are two multilateral treaties 
directly bearing on dramatic performers’ rights: the 1961 Rome Convention 
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations21 and the 2012 Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual 
Performances. Besides the Copyright Office’s Compendium (discussed 
below), perhaps the greatest foray into the question of actors’ copyright 
taken by executive and legislative branch officials has been the role of the 
United States in negotiating the latter of these two instruments.22 
                                                                                                            
18 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42 (Can.) last amended June 19, 2017. 
19 Id. 
20 See id. § 15 (providing that although musical performer’s performances in “sound recordings” 
receive wider protection, the Section 2 definition of sound recordings “excludes any soundtrack of a 
cinematographic work where it accompanies the cinematographic work”). The Association of Canadian 
Television and Radio Actors (ACTRA) takes the position that Canadian audiovisual performers are not 
adequately protected. See Intellectual Property Rights for Performers, ACTRA, http://www.actra.ca/wp-
content/uploads/Intellectual-Property-Protection-Backgrounder-1.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) 
(“Currently, only Canadian audio performers are protected under the Copyright Act, leaving audiovisual 
performers’ moral and economic rights vulnerable to exploitation.”). 
21 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
22 The author was a member of the U.S. delegation to the 2000 diplomatic conference discussed 
here and head of the U.S. delegation to the 2012 diplomatic conference discussed; he was also chairman 
of “Main Committee II” of the 2000 diplomatic conference. For confirming the discussion in these pages, 
my thanks to Jukka Lieddes, Shira Perlmutter, and Robert L. Stoll. Jukka Liedes is a Finnish government 
official who served as Chairman of “Main Committee 1” of both the 1996 and 2000 diplomatic 
conferences. Email from Jukka Liedes to author (July 22, 2018) (on file with author). Shira Perlmutter 
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While the Berne Convention leaves open the possibility that actors 
might be joint authors of a film under a national copyright law, the 1961 
Rome Convention was the first multilateral treaty to obligate contracting 
parties to provide dramatic performers with copyright-like rights.23 Article 
7 of the Rome Convention gives performers, including actors, rights to 
control fixation and broadcasting of their performances as well as certain 
reproductions of their fixed performances.24 But the Rome Convention then 
provides—in an article specifically directed at “Performers’ Rights in 
Films”—that “once a performer has consented to the incorporation of his 
performance in a visual or audio-visual fixation, Article 7 shall have no 
further application.”25 This provision, which has been transposed into many 
national laws, has been criticized for substantially weakening whatever 
protection the Rome Convention might have established. Although there are 
over ninety countries that are contracting parties of the Rome Convention, 
three of the most important audiovisual production countries—China, India, 
and the United States—are not.26 
After the completion of the WTO agreements27 in the early 1990s, 
negotiations started on extensive revision of the Berne and Rome 
Conventions to cover emerging digital and network issues. Some elements 
of this ambitious agenda28 came to fruition in the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
                                                                                                            
also participated in all three of the diplomatic conferences described here: in 1996 as head of the U.S. 
Copyright Office’s Office of Policy and International Affairs; in 2000 as a representative of the 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industries (IFPI); and in 2012 as head of the USPTO’s 
Office of Policy and International Affairs. Email from Shira Perlmutter, Chief Policy Officer & Dir. for 
Int’l Affairs, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to author (July 10, 2018) (on file with author). Robert 
Stoll was head Office of Legislative and International Affairs, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, at the 
time of the 2000 diplomatic conference. Email from Robert Stoll to author (Mar. 16, 2018) (on file with 
author). 
23 Rome Convention, supra note 21, at art. 7.  
24 Id. at art. 7. 
25 Id. at art. 19. 
26 See WIPO-Administered Treaties, WIPO 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=17 (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) (noting that 
India was an original signatory of the convention, but never ratified it). Other countries that are not bound 
by the Rome Convention include Bangladesh, Botswana, Cambodia, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Morocco, 
Mali, Myanmar, Namibia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, and Thailand. Id. 
27 The WTO agreements include the TRIPS Agreement. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/anex1_e.pdf. 
28 By August 1996, the WIPO’s Committee on Experts presented “Basic Proposals” for three new 
substantive treaties: 
1. ‘Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works’, 
2. ‘Treaty for the Protection of the Rights of Performers and Producers of 
Phonograms’,  
3. ‘Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases’. 
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(WCT) and the WIPO Phonograms and Performances Treaty (WPPT), both 
of which were finalized at a diplomatic conference in December 1996.29 The 
WCT established new international legal norms for copyright concerning: 
(a) separate, exclusive rights of distribution and communication;30 (b) 
obligations on the protection of “rights management information”;31 and (c) 
obligations vis-à-vis “technological measures” that copyright owners may 
use in connection with the exclusive copyright rights.32 The WPPT provides 
largely parallel developments for the rights of musical performers and 
phonogram producers, while also giving musical performers a right of 
fixation against unauthorized recordings.33  
The 1996 Diplomatic Conference left two major agenda items 
unresolved: (a) the extra copyright protection of collections of information; 
and (b) the rights of audiovisual performers. The first of these, proposed by 
the European Union,34 was left by the wayside in part because opposition 
                                                                                                            
Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Basic Proposal 
for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty for the Protection of the Rights of Performers and Producers 
of Phonograms to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, ¶ 15, at 4, WIPO Doc. No. CRNR/DC/5 
(Aug. 30, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/diplconf/en/crnr_dc/crnr_dc_5.pdf; see 
also Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Basic Proposal 
for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, ¶15, at 4, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4 
(Aug. 30, 1996), available at www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/diplconf/en/crnr_dc/crnr_dc_4.pdf (proposing 
the same three treaties). 
29 WIPO, WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), Dec. 20, 1996 [hereinafter WCT], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/wct/trt_wct_001en.pdf; WIPO, WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996 [hereinafter WPPT], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/wppt/trt_wppt_001en.pdf. Both were adopted by the 
WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions in Geneva, on 
December 20, 1996. 
30 WCT, supra note 29, arts. 6, 8. Article 6 of the WCT is captioned “Right of Distribution” and 
establishes a general “exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the original and 
copies” of works. Id. at art. 6. Article 8 of the WCT is captioned “Right of Communication to the Public” 
and establishes that authors shall enjoy an “exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the 
public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their 
works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.” Id. at art. 8. This last phrase is intended to describe generally Internet 
distribution and delivery, but the interconnection of the two Articles is clear in that Article 8 equates a 
“making available to the public” via wire or wireless means as a “communication to the public.” Id.; see 
also WPPT, supra note 29, at arts. 8, 10 (providing rights that parallel those in the WCT). 
31 WCT, supra note 29, at art. 12.  
32 Id. at art. 11. 
33 WPPT, supra note 29, at art. 6(ii). 
34 The European Union had promulgated a directive establishing sui generis protection of the 
investment in collections of information. Directive 96/9, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20, ¶¶ 20–28.  
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from the scientific and library communities35 made it impossible for the 
United States to move forward on the topic.36  
In contrast, there was sustained interest in—if not agreement about—the 
protection of audiovisual performers.37 The 1996 Diplomatic Conference 
had been unable to include audiovisual performers in the WPPT because the 
American motion picture industry was concerned about both moral rights 
for actors and guaranteeing international recognition of contractual 
agreements that transfer actors’ economic rights to film producers.38 But 
                                                                                                            
35 For samples of the criticism of the Database Directive during that period, see J.H. Reichman & 
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997). 
36 But for several years after, Congress entertained proposals for domestic laws providing sui 
generis protection of non-creative databases under the Commerce Clause. See Justin Hughes, How Extra-
Copyright Protection of Databases Can be Constitutional, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159, 167–68 (2003) 
(describing American attempts to establish similar protections during the second half of the 1990s). 
Eventually that debate died out, partly because commercial business models based on distribution of 
databases have largely been replaced by commercial business models based on information retrieval 
services. When was the last time you saw a printed airline schedule booklet, used a newspaper’s movie 
listings to determine what film you would see, or found a phone number with White Pages printed on 
paper? 
37 Seth Greenstein’s daily reports from the 1996 Diplomatic Conference provide some insight. See, 
e.g., Seth Greenstein, Day Four -- Officers Selected, Opening Statements, WAYBACKMACHINE (Dec. 5, 
1996), http://web.archive.org/web/19970301065434/http://hrrc.org:80/wr_12-5.html. (“[In the opening 
statement, t]he representative from Ireland spoke generally on behalf of the European Union countries. 
He promoted a high level of protection also for audiovisual performers and producers . . . .”); Seth 
Greenstein, Day Seven -- The AudioVisual Debate, and What's Fair is Fair Use, WAYBACKMACHINE 
(Dec. 10, 1996), http://web.archive.org/web/19970301065341/http://hrrc.org:80/wr_12-10.html 
(detailing how the US delegation was showing willingness to accept economic rights if transfers of rights 
were recognized); Seth Greenstein, Day Nine -- Champagne and Broken Glass, WAYBACKMACHINE 
(Dec. 12, 1996), http://web.archive.org/web/19970301065319/http://hrrc.org:80/wr_12-12.html (“[T]he 
success of this treaty is threatened more by traditional disputes between the copyright and authors' right 
systems -- should performers in audiovisual works obtain the same rights as producers? Would the United 
States have to increase the limited scope of its performance right for sound recordings?”); Seth 
Greenstein, Day Ten (and Eleven) -- Public Optimism, Private Meetings, WAYBACKMACHINE (Dec. 13–
14, 1996), http://web.archive.org/web/19970301065301/http://hrrc.org:80/wr_12-13.html (“The EC and 
United States had dedicated a good part of the day, and discussions into the evening, to the resolution of 
the audiovisual dispute concerning performers' and producers' rights in audiovisual works.”); Seth 
Greenstein, The Final Day -- Two Treaties for WIPO, and One More for the Road, WAYBACKMACHINE 
(Dec. 20, 1996), http://web.archive.org/web/19970301065207/http://hrrc.org:80/wr_12-20.html (writing 
that the 1996 diplomatic conference ended with adoption of “the recommendation and resolution 
regarding a new conference on audiovisual works and regarding future work on database protection”). 
38 As characterized by one commentator, “[a]lthough the U.S. and European delegations were allied 
on almost all other intellectual property issues at the diplomatic conference, they were bitterly divided 
on a proposal to universalize European norms about rights of performers of audiovisual works which the 
U.S. motion picture industry regarded as an anathema. After the Europeans finally agreed to put off to 
another day the debate over international rights for audiovisual performers, the [WPPT] could be 
finalized.” Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 369, 371–72 (1997) 
(footnotes omitted). Only a few years before, the film producers had a bitter legislative fight in 
Washington with film directors over moral rights. See David A. Honicky, Film Labelling as a Cure for 
Colorization [and Other Alterations]: A Band-Aid for a Hatchet Job, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
409, 425, 427–28 (1994) (describing the fight between Congress and film producers over the 1992 
proposed Film Disclosure Act). 
 
 2019] ACTORS AS AUTHORS IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 11 
even when the Diplomatic Conference reached an impasse on these issues, 
the United States did not take the position that American actors lacked rights 
under existing U.S. law. 
Gaining international recognition of actors’ rights was important to the 
unions representing American actors, the Screen Actors Guild and the 
American Federation of Television and Radio Actors. Because the 
audiovisual producers must engage in intermittent collective bargaining with 
these unions, the film studios decided to support the actors’ position, as long 
as the “transfer of rights” issue could be addressed successfully and any 
moral rights provision would permit normal film editing and marketing 
practices. This allowed the United States to engage fully in the audiovisual 
performance discussions that continued after 1996 in WIPO’s Standing 
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights.39 Successive American 
administrations negotiated on the assumption that American copyright law 
provided the possibility that an actor could be an author of an audiovisual 
work, such that no additional rights would need to be added to the copyright 
system. This was similar to how the assumption that a musician could be an 
author of a sound recording under American law undergirded American 
willingness to negotiate and enter the WPPT.  
The audiovisual negotiations intensified in the late 1990s40 and seemed 
to bring WIPO closer to the finish line—close enough to convene another 
                                                                                                            
39 This included making a complete treaty proposal in late 1999. See WIPO Standing Committee 
on Copyright and Related Rights, Third Session, Agenda Item 4: Protection of Audiovisual 
Performances: Submission of the United States of America, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/3/7 (Nov. 3, 
1999), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_3/sccr_3_7.pdf (announcing that the United 
States would subsequently support further advancement of audiovisual performers’ rights). 
40 See, e.g., Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, First Session, Agenda Item 5: 
Protection of Audiovisual Performances: Submission Received from Member States of WIPO by 
September 30, 1998, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/1/4 (Oct. 1, 1998), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_1/sccr_1_4.pdf (documenting proposals from 
Japan and the United States, along with a report from Latin American countries); WIPO Standing 
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, First Session, Agenda Item 5: Protection of Audiovisual 
Performances: Submission of Canada, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/1/8 (Nov. 12, 1998), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_1/sccr_1_8.pdf (noting Canada’s objections to 
legislation that would allow for a deemed or presumed transfer of rights); WIPO Standing Committee on 
Copyright and Related Rights, Second Session, Agenda Item 4: Protection of Audiovisual Performances: 
Comparative Table of Proposals Received by February 28, 1999, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/2/4, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_2/sccr_2_4.pdf (detailing proposals by 
15 African countries, Canada, the European Union, and Korea); WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright 
and Related Rights, Third Session, Agenda Item 4: Protection of Audiovisual Performances: Additional 
Proposal of Japan Concerning Moral Rights, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/3/8 (Nov. 10, 1999) (footnote 
omitted), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_3/sccr_3_8.pdf 
(documenting a proposal from Japan on the moral rights of performers); WIPO Standing Committee on 
Copyright and Related Rights, Third Session, Agenda Item 4: Protection of Audiovisual Performances: 
Submission of Canada, at 2, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/3/9 (Nov. 11, 1999) (footnote omitted), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_3/sccr_3_9.pdf (presenting a proposal from Canada 
for uniform rules for recognizing the transfer of rights). 
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diplomatic conference in December 2000 dedicated exclusively to 
audiovisual performances. This 2000 “dipcon” found a formula to overcome 
film producers’ concerns over possible moral rights claims via an agreed 
statement that “modifications of a performance that are made in the normal 
course of exploitation of the performance, such as editing, compression, 
dubbing, or formatting, in existing or new media or formats” would not be 
considered violations of the new moral rights provision.41 In international 
law, such agreed statements should be given a central role in the 
interpretation of any ambiguities in a treaty’s provisions.42  
Yet while overcoming film producers’ hesitation about moral rights, the 
2000 Diplomatic Conference was unable to craft legal norms that would 
apply comfortably to both continental European and American film 
production systems, especially to give security to contractual transfers of 
economic rights from actors to film producers. This “consolidation of rights” 
issue caused the meeting to end in a stalemate: the United States, supported 
by India, insisted on a “transfer of rights” provision that would ensure major 
film producers could distribute their films globally while the European 
Union opposed all proposals for such a provision.43   
                                                                                                            
41 WIPO, Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, June 24, 2012, at n. 5 [hereinafter Beijing 
Treaty] (“For the purposes of this Treaty and without prejudice to any other treaty, it is understood that, 
considering the nature of audiovisual fixations and their production and distribution, modifications of a 
performance that are made in the normal course of exploitation of the performance, such as editing, 
compression, dubbing, or formatting, in existing or new media or formats, and that are made in the course 
of a use authorized by the performer, would not in themselves amount to modifications within the 
meaning of Article 5(1)(ii). Rights under Article 5(1)(ii) are concerned only with changes that are 
objectively prejudicial to the performer’s reputation in a substantial way. It is also understood that the 
mere use of new or changed technology or media, as such, does not amount to modification within the 
meaning of Article 5(1)(ii).”). All elements in the 2012 Beijing Treaty, with the exception of Article 12, 
were completed in 2000. The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances – An EIFL Briefing for 
Libraries, EIFL (June 2013), http://www.eifl.net/resources/beijing-treaty-audiovisual-performances-
eifl-briefing-libraries. 
42 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, such an “agreed statement” almost 
certainly constitutes an “agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
conne[c]tion with the conclusion of the treaty” which is part of the context used for primary interpretation 
of any treaty provision. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
art. 31(2)(a) at 340.  
43 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF THE 2012 WIPO 
AUDIOVISUAL PERFORMANCES TREATY, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter Obama Administration, Background 
and Summary of Beijing], available at 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/WIPO_AVP_TREATY_FACT_SHEET.pdf (“The U.S., 
supported by India, insisted on a ‘transfer of rights’ provision that major film producers felt was needed 
to ensure their ability to distribute films globally; the European Union opposed all proposals for such a 
provision.”); The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, Done at Beijing on June 24, 2012, 
February 10, 2016, S. Treaty Doc. No. 114-8, V–VI [hereinafter 2016 Transmittal Letter] (“Countries 
narrowed the gaps at a diplomatic conference in 2000, but deadlocked over the issue of how performers 
could transfer to producers, by contract or otherwise, their exclusive rights regarding the uses of their 
performances.”); see also Deming Liu, The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (2012), in 
WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 25.03 (Trevor Cook ed., 4th ed. 2015) (describing how Article 12 on transfer 
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Following this inconclusive conclusion—so inconclusive that the 
diplomatic conference was adjourned, not closed—everyone involved in the 
negotiations understood that until there was a consensus on transfer of rights, 
the treaty could not be completed. For the next decade, further discussions 
were effectively pro forma.44 In 2010–2011, those negotiations were taken 
up again by the Obama Administration and the prior impasse was broken 
with compromise language initially drafted by India, Mexico, and the United 
States, which was then supported by the European Union, Brazil, and 
Nigeria.45 Based on that language, the WIPO members convened a 
diplomatic conference in Beijing46 and completed what is now known as the 
Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances.47 
 The Beijing Treaty establishes for dramatic performers the same rights 
to their performances in audiovisual works that musicians have to their 
performances in sound recordings under the 1996 WPPT, ratified by the 
United States in 1998. A 2012 Administration document48 described the 
government’s view of the compatibility of the treaty with current U.S. law 
as follows: 
• Under U.S. law, actors and musicians are considered to be 
“authors” of their performances, providing them with 
copyright rights. 
• Just as the rights established in U.S. law already provide 
the protection for musical performers mandated by the 
                                                                                                            
of rights “was agreed by consensus at the 22nd Session of the SCCR held in 2011, enshrining a 
compromise designed to obtain the agreement of all concerned.”).  
44 Obama Administration, Background and Summary of Beijing, supra note 43, at 1 (“For the next 
decade, the incomplete AVP languished on the agenda of WIPO's Standing Committee on Copyright and 
Related Rights (SCCR).”). 
45 Id. at 2 (“The United States, Mexico, and India delegations achieved compromise language, 
working closely with the delegations of other major film-producing jurisdictions, particularly the EU, 
Brazil, and Nigeria.”); Liu, supra note 43, at 25.03. 
46 Obama Administration, Background and Summary of Beijing, supra note 43, at 2; see also David 
Kappos, A Milestone In Protecting Creative Content Around the World, DIR.'S FORUM: A BLOG FROM 
USPTO'S LEADERSHIP (June 26, 2012), 
https://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/a_milestone_in_protecting_creative (“A breakthrough to the 
stalemate occurred in 2010, when . . . [w]ith substantial input from the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), and the American Federation of Television and Radio 
Artists (AFTRA), the United States submitted a proposal, and then worked with other delegations that 
had submitted proposals (Mexico, India) as well as with delegations from other major film-producing 
jurisdictions (particularly the European Union, Brazil and Nigeria) to find compromise language.”).  
47 Beijing Treaty, supra note 41. 
48 Obama Administration, Background and Summary of Beijing, supra note 43. Judges in the Ninth 
Circuit characterized this document as a “USPTO” document when in fact the text was approved by an 
inter-agency process that included the State Department, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the 
Institute of Museums and Libraries, and the U.S. Copyright Office. In this sense, it is more accurately 
characterized as an Administration document. The author of this Article was also the principal author of 
the Administration document, reflecting the consensus views of the agencies above. 
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WPPT, U.S. law is already generally compatible with the 
Beijing Treaty provisions.  
• Nonetheless, implementation of the Beijing Treaty may 
require some technical amendments of the Copyright Act, 
in particular the Title 17 reference to existing international 
copyright obligations, or “points of attachment” for parties 
to this treaty under U.S. law. 
• If the negotiations are successful, then subject to 
authorization by the Secretary of State and the 
Administration, the Beijing Treaty—like the WCT and 
WPPT—would be submitted for the advice and consent of 
the Senate.49  
While this 2012 Administration document refers to “technical 
amendments,” a full implementation of the Beijing Treaty would require 
express acknowledgement of one new right for actors: a right to prevent the 
fixation of their performances.50 This right was established for musicians in 
the 1990s in § 1101 of Title 17.51 The right was subsequently upheld in a 
series of litigation testing its constitutionality.52 Whether or not extension of 
this “right of fixation” to dramatic actors counts as a “technical amendment,” 
it could be achieved through simple amendment of § 1101 and 18 U.S.C. § 
2319A.53 And that is exactly what the Administration proposed in February 
2016 when it sent the Beijing Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification. 
Consistent with the view that American copyright law already offers 
actors the possibility of being “authors,” the transmittal package from the 
State Department to the Senate states that only “[n]arrow changes in U.S. 
law will be needed for the United States to implement certain provisions of 
the treaty,”54 and “[f]or the most part, existing U.S. law, principally the 
                                                                                                            
49 Obama Administration, Background and Summary of Beijing, supra note 43, at 2. 
50 Compare id. (“Nonetheless, implementation of the AVP may require some technical amendments 
of the Copyright Act, in particular where Title 17 refers to existing international copyright obligations 
(‘points of attachment’ for parties to this treaty under U.S. law).”), with Beijing Treaty, supra note 41, at 
art. 7 (footnote omitted) (“Performers shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the direct or indirect 
reproduction of their performances fixed in audiovisual fixations, in any manner or form.”). 
51 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
52 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 
1036 (2000) (upholding the criminal provision against bootlegging, § 2319A, as an exercise of 
Commerce Clause power); United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding the 
criminal provision against bootlegging on the grounds that it is not a copyright law and there was “no 
need to examine whether it violates limits of the Copyright Clause.”); KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport 
Int’l Prods., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (upholding § 1101 as a constitutional exercise 
of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause). 
53 Justin Hughes, Understanding (and Fixing) the Right of Fixation in Copyright Law, 62 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 385, 388 (2015) [hereinafter Hughes, Right of Fixation]. 
54 2016 Transmittal Letter, supra note 43, at III.  
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Copyright Act, would enable the United States to implement the obligations 
of the Beijing Treaty.”55 The transmittal also states the Beijing Treaty: 
[F]ills a gap in the international copyright system by extending 
to such performers the type of protections previously accorded 
to authors and to performers and producers of sound 
recordings, pursuant to existing international agreements to 
which the United States is a party. The Treaty's framework is 
consistent with existing U.S. standards[.]56  
All of these statements could be interpreted as vague bureaucratese, but 
the only statutory changes proposed by the Obama Administration were 
changes to lists of treaties mentioned in Title 1757 and an amendment of § 
1101 to give actors a right of fixation enforced by a civil cause of action. 
The proposed amendment would do this by deleting the limiting words 
“music” and “musical” from § 1101 and adding “images” to § 1101 along 
with a § 101 definition.58 The only reasonable interpretation of the fact that 
no other changes were proposed is that the consensus view of the experts in 
the government was that actors already can be authors under the Copyright 
Act—the same view as we will see is found in the Copyright Office’s 
Compendium.  
II. AMBIGUITY IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. The Copyright Office Compendium’s View 
Lacking the clear statutory mandate of Canadian copyright law, what 
evidence is there that American copyright law treats actors as authors? 
Among statements from the executive and legislative branches,59 perhaps 
                                                                                                            
55 Id. at VIII.  
56 Id. at V. 
57 Beijing Treaty Implementation Act of 2016, 114th Cong. (2016) available at 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Beijing-treaty-package.pdf (as transmitted from 
Under Secretary of Commerce Michelle Lee to President of the Senate Joseph Biden, Feb. 26, 2016).  
58 Id. at 2.  
59 Housed in the Library of Congress, the question of whether the U.S. Copyright Office is an 
Article I or Article II entity has been litigated inconclusively. Compare Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 
294, 301 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding Register of Copyrights to be executive branch officer), with United 
States v. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. 830, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that the Copyright Office is not in the 
executive branch). In practice, the Copyright Office is only partially integrated into the executive 
branch’s copyright policy apparatus. See also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and 
Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 764 
(2001) (describing Copyright Office as “strictly part of the legislative branch”); Andy Gass, Considering 
Copyright Rulemaking: The Constitutional Question, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1047, 1047 (2012); Justin 
Hughes, Making Copyright Policy in Washington, THE HILL (Jan. 23, 2015, 12:00 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/the-administration/230449-making-copyright-policy-in-
washington. 
 
 16 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1 
the most explicit is the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practice, 
which unequivocally recognizes the dramatic performance of actors as a 
basis for authorship in an audiovisual work.60 Section 808.4 of the 
Compendium identifies ten “Elements of Motion Picture Authorship” in the 
following order: production, direction, cinematography, performance, 
animation, screenplay or script, works that precede a screenplay or script, 
editing, musical score, and soundtrack.61 The Compendium then defines 
performance: “Performance refers to the acting, speaking, singing, or 
dancing in a motion picture.”62 And the Compendium makes clear that 
“motion pictures” encompasses all audiovisual works.63  
In other words, the Compendium recognizes that dramatic performances 
are protectable expression that is a basis for authorship in audiovisual works. 
That is not the same thing as saying that dramatic performances are 
protectable works, although under some circumstances—as explored in Part 
III—that might be the case. Oddly, in the Garcia v. Google litigation, the 
courts discussed and debated a letter from the Copyright Office and a fact 
sheet from the Obama Administration, but there was complete silence vis-à-
vis the Copyright Office’s most comprehensive and authoritative statement 
of what is protected by copyright in American law,64 despite the fact that at 
least two amici briefs65—one discussed by the bench and counsel at oral 
argument66—pointed the judges to the Compendium. 
B. Views from the Bench 
Opinions from the bench addressing copyright in dramatic performances 
have been rare and sporadic,67 but glimmers in the case law show courts 
considering dramatic performances to be original expression providing a 
                                                                                                            
60 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 307 (3d ed. 2014) 
(rev. Sept. 29, 2017) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]. 
61 Id. at § 808.4. 
62 Id. at § 808.4(D). 
63 Id. at § 808.5 (“Motion pictures include movies of all genres . . . [and] television programs and 
commercials (e.g., comedy, drama, reality, news, advertisements), music and educational videos, and 
short videos posted online.”). 
64 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 751–52 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
(Garcia III). 
65 Brief for Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio Artists et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Garcia III, 786 F.3d 733 (No. 12-57302); Brief for Professors 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Justin Hughes, Peter Menell, & David Nimmer as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party, Garcia III, 786 F.3d 733 (No. 12-57302) [hereinafter Balganesh et al. Brief]. 
66 Oral Argument at 49:30, Garcia III, 786 F.3d 733 (No. 12-57302), 
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000006884 (discussing Balganesh et al. 
Brief).  
67 See Jacob M. Victor, Garcia v. Google and a “Related Rights” Alternative to Copyright in Acting 
Performances, 124 YALE L.J.F. 80, 82 (2014) (“[C]ourts rarely have the opportunity to address the issue 
of whether film actors maintain independent copyright interests in their performances.”). 
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basis for authorship. Such comments have occurred in dicta or in holdings 
that could be read in alternative ways, mainly in disputes in which a state 
law claim brought by the plaintiff is precluded by a dramatic performance 
being in the realm of federal copyright. 
An early example—and one that is understandably criticized—is the 
Seventh Circuit’s 1986 decision in Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League 
Baseball Players’ Association.68 In that case, the players’ association 
claimed that live telecasts of major league baseball (MLB) games violated 
the players’ individual rights of publicity.69 Both the district court and the 
appellate panel concluded that MLB ownership of the copyright in the 
baseball telecasts preempted any right of publicity claims under state law.70 
Copyright experts would agree with the conclusion of the Baltimore 
Orioles court that the telecasts were copyrighted works based on the 
originality of the camera people and director, as well as the simultaneous 
fixation of the telecasts.71 But in an extended footnote, the appellate court 
went on to conclude that the players’ performances while playing baseball 
had sufficient originality to be protected by copyright once fixed in a 
tangible medium: 
The Players argue that their performances are not 
copyrightable works because they lack sufficient artistic merit. 
We disagree. Only a modicum of creativity is required for a 
work to be copyrightable . . . . A recording of a performance 
generally includes creative contributions by both the director 
and other individuals responsible for recording the 
performance and by the performers whose performance is 
captured . . . . Judged by the above standard, the Players’ 
performances possess the modest creativity required for 
copyrightability. 72 
Further in the opinion, the appellate panel doubled down on this footnote 
analysis. The Players’ Association argued that by asserting publicity rights 
in their performances, “the works in which they assert rights are not fixed in 
tangible form, their rights of publicity in their performances are not subject 
                                                                                                            
68 Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).  
69 Id. at 681.  
70 Id. at 676.  
71 Id. at 668–69 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1985), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5665) ( “When a football game is being covered by four television cameras, with a director guiding 
the activities of the four cameramen and choosing which of their electronic images are sent to the public 
and in which order, there is little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are doing constitutes 
‘authorship.’”); id. at 669 n.7 (“[T]he Players agree that the cameramen and director contribute creative 
labor to the telecasts.”).  
72 Id. at 669, n.7. 
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to preemption.”73 The panel met this head-on with reasoning that can be 
interpreted as saying that an individual athlete’s performances would be 
protected under copyright:  
The Players’ performances are embodied in a copy, viz, the 
videotape of the telecast, from which the performances can be 
perceived, reproduced, and otherwise communicated 
indefinitely. Hence, their performances are fixed in tangible 
form, and any property rights in the performances that are 
equivalent to any of the rights encompassed in a copyright are 
preempted. 74 
This conclusion as to the copyrightability of sports performances may 
be problematic, principally on the grounds that playing a game is not 
“expressive” in the sense that the concept is used in copyright doctrine75—
the appellate court was itself aware of this issue.76 But that wrinkle would 
disappear if “Players” in this passage is read as theatrical players, not sports 
players.  
Of course, the fact that federal copyright preempts state law protection 
of X does not mean that federal copyright protects X. But the Baltimore 
Orioles panel and a subsequent Central District of California decision 
concluded that “[o]nce a performance is reduced to tangible form, there is 
no distinction between the performance and the recording of the 
performance for purposes of preemption under § 301(a).”77 This warrants 
some parsing.  
                                                                                                            
73 Id. at 675. 
74 Id. 
75 See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“[B]asketball games do not fall within the subject matter of federal copyright protection because they 
do not constitute ‘original works of authorship’ under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).”). But Paul Goldstein has 
defended the possibility of copyright in the movements of sports players. See infra notes 184–87 and 
accompanying text. The Baltimore Orioles panel’s approach can also be criticized on the grounds that 
they reasoned that the performances have great commercial value and, citing Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), that courts “should not gainsay the copyrightability of a work 
possessing great commercial value simply because the work’s aesthetic or educational value is not readily 
apparent to a person trained in the law.” Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669 n.7. Not everyone is happy 
with that thread drawn from Bleistein. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic 
Progress, and the Making of American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2017) (reasoning that 
Holmes used “personality” as the threshold for originality and—regrettably—commercial value as the 
threshold for “progress”). 
76 The court reiterated that its conclusion on the copyrightability of the telecasts and, therefore, the 
preemption of the right of publicity claim, would hold regardless of originality in the athletic 
performances. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d. at 676 (“Regardless of the creativity of the Players’ 
performances, the works in which they assert rights are copyrightable works which come within the scope 
of § 301(a) because of the creative contributions of the individuals responsible for recording the Players’ 
performances.”). 
77 Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 675; Trenton v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1416, 1424 
(C.D. Cal. 1994). 
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The “recording of a performance” would normally be considered a 
“work.” And to the degree that the recording of the performance captures 
other things—costumes, sets, lighting, camera angles, and equipment 
choices—there would be a distinction between a “recording of the 
performance” and the recorded performance. But if we could eliminate those 
other things—as discussed in Part III.A—it actually might be the case that 
there would be little or “no distinction between the performance and the 
recording of the performance.” 
Two more preemption cases went further in this direction of finding that 
a performance, once recorded, can be a copyrightable work. In a 1996 
California state court case, Fleet v. CBS, Inc.,78 the court considered a 
compensation dispute between producers of the film White Dragon and 
some of the films’ actors. Because there was no question that CBS owned 
the copyright in White Dragon, the plaintiffs alleged that CBS “did not have 
permission to utilize their names, pictures, or likenesses in conjunction with 
any exploitation of the film.” 79  
The court concluded that section 301 of the Copyright Act preempted 
the plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims.80 While agreeing that California’s 
Civil Code section 3344 was “intended to protect rights which cannot be 
copyrighted,” 81 the court concluded that the actors’ claim “crumbles in the 
face of one obvious fact: their individual performances in the film White 
Dragon were copyrightable.”82 Squarely answering the actors-as-authors 
issue, the court concluded that once the “performances were put on film, 
they became ‘dramatic work[s]’ [that were] ‘fixed in [a] tangible medium of 
expression’”83 and that upon fixation, “the performances came within the 
scope or subject matter of copyright law protection.”84 Strictly speaking, this 
reasoning was not necessary to the preemption outcome. The court could 
have concluded that the right of publicity claims were simply preempted 
because the claims sought “only to prevent CBS from reproducing and 
distributing” the copyrighted film.85 But the reasoning that “performances,” 
once fixed, became “dramatic works” was certainly what CBS had 
vigorously argued.86 
                                                                                                            
78 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
79 Id. CBS released the film anyway and included a picture of one of the plaintiffs “on the packaging 
and [in] advertising materials.” Id. 
80 Id. at 649. 
81 Id. at 650. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)). 
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Brief for Respondent at 7, Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (1996) (No. BC 092926) 
(“[T]he performances in the Motion Picture . . . are works of authorship subject to copyright.”); see also 
id. at 10 (“[T]he subject matters of appellants’ claims (their performance in a Motion Picture) are ‘works 
of authorship’ fixed in a ‘tangible medium . . . .’”); id. at 13–14 (“All commentators and case authority 
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Following Fleet v. CBS, Inc., a Ninth Circuit panel reached a similar 
outcome in a similar fact pattern, but with less definitive language. In the 
2010 Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc.87 litigation, 
pornographic actor Jules Jordan and his one-man company brought an action 
against parties who were clearly pirating Jordan’s adult films. A jury found 
for Jordan on both copyright infringement and right of publicity claims,88 
but the court granted the defendants’ motion for directed verdict on the 
grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the copyright claims.89 
This left the plaintiff with the successful California right of publicity claim, 
and the defendants then appealed on the grounds that the right of publicity 
claim was preempted by federal copyright law.90 
Jordan’s state right of public claim was based on misappropriation of his 
name, his “persona,” and his “dramatic performance.”91 The court concluded 
that the claimed misappropriation of Jordan’s name and persona were “based 
entirely on the misappropriation of the DVDs and [Jordan’s] performance 
therein,”92 reducing the right of publicity claim to a claim of misappropriated 
dramatic performance. As to preemption by federal copyright, the panel 
reasoned: 
Whether a claim is preempted under Section 301 does not turn 
on what rights the alleged infringer possesses, but on whether 
the rights asserted by the plaintiff are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of the copyright. The 
question is whether the rights are works of authorship fixed in 
a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject 
matter of the Copyright Act. If a plaintiff asserts a claim that 
is the equivalent of a claim for infringement of a copyrightable 
work, that claim is preempted . . . .93 
On this basis, the panel concluded that Jordan’s right of publicity claims 
were preempted.94 Strictly speaking, the Jules Jordan court only concluded 
                                                                                                            
agree that an actors’ performance in a film has the requisite degree of artistic creativity to be a work 
protected by copyright law.”). 
87 617 F.3d 1146, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2010). 
88 Id. at 1151. 
89 Id. at 1152 (“The court granted defendants’ motion, concluding that because Gasper was 
employed by JJV the motion picture[s] were works for hire under 17 U.S.C. § 101 and that JJV was the 
author, leaving Gasper without standing. The court also concluded that because the copyright registration 
in Gasper’s name was invalid, JJV had no standing.”). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1153. 
92 Id.; see also id. at 1154 (“[T]hroughout the litigation Gasper has claimed that the factual basis of 
his right of publicity claim was the unauthorized reproduction of his performance on the DVDs.”). 
93 Id. at 1154–55 (emphasis added). 
94 Id. at 1155. While finding that the California right of publicity was preempted, the appellate court 
reinstated the jury’s copyright infringement judgment against the defendants. Id. at 1160. 
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that the rights Jordan asserted under California law over his recorded 
performances were “equivalent to the rights contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106, 
which articulates the exclusive rights of copyright holders.”95 This is not 
precisely the Fleet court holding that when dramatic “performances were put 
on film, they became ‘dramatic work[s]’ ‘fixed in [a] tangible medium of 
expression.’”96 But it seems close. 
Finally, two additional federal court decisions before the Garcia v. 
Google litigation merit discussion. In the 2007 Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer97 case, a Ninth Circuit panel was faced with the claim that joint 
authorship in a movie treatment gave rise to joint authorship in the resulting 
film. Pushing back against this claim, the panel expressly gave the lead 
actor’s acting—“Peter Sellers’s legendary comedic performance”—as an 
example of a legitimate basis for joint authorship on par with the film 
director.98  
The same year as Richlin, the federal district court in Puerto Rico 
considered a copycat television show dispute between two television 
stations, TMTV Corp. v. Pegasus Broadcasting.99 From 1997 to 1999, 
TMTV produced and broadcasted a show called “20 Pisos de Historia.”100 A 
year after “20 Pisos” went off the air, a competitor station began airing a 
weekly sitcom called “El Condominio.”101 Many of the actors appearing in 
“El Condominio” had played the same or similar characters in “20 Pisos.”102 
When a dispute arose between the television stations, these “El 
Condominio” actors sued TMTV “for declaratory judgment of ownership 
over the copyrights to the characters they portray in that series,”103 while 
TMTV counterclaimed on the basis that it owned “20 Pisos” and the 
characters therein.104 
Against the actors’ claim that they, not TMTV, owned the characters 
created in “20 Pisos,” TMTV argued “that the actors cannot hold the 
copyright to the characters, because they did not write the scripts in which 
[the characters] appear.”105 The district court denied TMTV summary 
                                                                                                            
95 Id. at 1153 (emphasis added) (quoting Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1138 
(9th Cir. 2006)). 
96 Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).  
97 531 F.3d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 2007). 
98 See id. at 970 (explaining the potential bases for co-authorship in the Pink Panther film were 
“Peter Sellers’s legendary comedic performance, Henry Mancini’s memorable score, or Blake Edwards’s 
award-winning direction”). 
99 TMTV Corp. v. Pegasus Broad. of San Juan, 490 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230 (D.P.R. 2007). 
100 Id. “20 Pisos” means “20 floors”—as in a tall apartment building—while “de Historia” could be 
a play on words, meaning both “of history” and “of stories.”  
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 236. 
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judgment on this basis “because it is evident from the record that the actors 
portrayed the characters in an audiovisual media, which permits a reasonable 
inference that the actors’ contribution to the characters rendered them 
authors.”106 A reasonable reading of this passage is that the court viewed the 
final characters—as seen in the recorded television shows—as a composite 
of what had been written in the script and original expression contributed by 
the actors in the course of their recorded performances. 
Along with the Copyright Office Compendium, this case law was largely 
ignored by the various opinions that issued in the Garcia v. Google 
litigation, a fact pattern incredible by even the standards of Hollywood.  
C. The Strange and Strained Saga of Garcia v. Google 
In bare-bone form, Cindy Lee Garcia was a struggling actor who 
believed that she had been hired to perform in a low-budget film tentatively 
entitled Desert Warrior. Film projects often change titles and scripts after 
casts are hired, but Mark Basseley Youssef, the producer who hired Garcia 
for the film, may never have intended to make the work he represented to 
the cast and crew.107 What we know for sure is that Youssef used Garcia’s 
short performance—with at least partial dubbing over her voice—in 
Innocence of Muslims, a bizarre extended trailer that appeared on YouTube 
in the summer of 2012.108 The fourteen-minute video seemed designed to 
offend Muslims109 and Garcia’s very brief appearance in the video garnered 
her multiple death threats, some based on a fatwa that all involved should 
die.110 
Garcia sought a preliminary injunction to have the video taken down 
from YouTube,111 with her lawyer seeming to claim a copyright in Garcia’s 
                                                                                                            
106 Id. 
107 See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 940 (9th Cir. 2014), dissolved by, 786 F.3d 733 (9th 
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“This is a troubling case. Garcia was duped into providing an artistic performance 
that was used in a way she never could have foreseen. Her unwitting and unwilling inclusion in 
‘Innocence of Muslims’ led to serious threats against her life.”). 
108 See Brooks Barnes, YouTube Wrongly Forced to Remove Anti-Muslim Movie Trailer, Appeals 
Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/business/media/youtube-wrongly-forced-to-remove-anti-muslim-
movie-trailer-appeals-court-rules.html (describing the film and Garcia’s role).  
109 See id. (noting the film’s depiction of the Prophet Muhammad “as a bloodthirsty thug”). 
110 See Andrew Blankstein & Ned Parker, Police Probe Threats, Fatwa Against ‘Innocence of 
Muslims’ Actors, L.A. TIMES: L.A. NOW (Sept. 21, 2012, 7:17 AM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/09/police-probe-threats-fatwa-against-innocence-of-
muslims-actors.html (describing the fatwa issued by an Egyptian cleric against all associated with the 
film); Jane C. Ginsburg, Actors as Authors?, MEDIA INST. (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2014/120114.php (“For her unwitting participation, Garcia received 
death threats and sought without success to have the film removed from YouTube.”). 
111 Garcia v. Nakoula, No. CV 12-08315-MWF, 2012 WL 12878355, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 
2012), aff’d sub nom. en banc, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). Garcia initially 
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performance.112 This posture was clearly a matter of litigation strategy. First, 
Garcia could not credibly argue that she was the sole author of the entire 
video. Second, the legal conclusion that she was a joint author of the video 
would mean that any other joint author could authorize distribution of the 
video—as Youssef did—and Garcia would only be entitled to a financial 
accounting.113 A claim of joint authorship would not only fail to lead to the 
relief she wanted, it also would have been inconsistent with Garcia’s 
allegation that she had been duped into participating in the video. In other 
words, how could she contend that she had the intention to be a joint author 
of a work in circumstances in which she alleged to have been defrauded as 
to the nature of the work?  
Given this dilemma, Garcia’s counsel “argue[d] only that she owns the 
copyright in her performance within the Film.”114 The district court was 
unconvinced that Garcia had a likelihood of success on the merits,115 and in 
November 2012, the court declined to grant Garcia a temporary 
injunction.116 From there, the case moved to the Ninth Circuit.117 
In February 2014, a divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district 
court, issuing a slightly amended opinion a few months later. Writing for the 
majority, Chief Judge Kozinski found that Garcia “likely has an independent 
[copyright] interest in her performance,”118 that she had not transferred or 
licensed those rights to Youssef, and that an injunction was warranted. 
Garcia’s allegations that she had been defrauded as to the nature of the 
video/film was a keystone of this reasoning. Because of Youssef’s 
fraudulent misrepresentation as to the nature of the film, Garcia could not 
have impliedly licensed use of her performance,119 and there was neither an 
employment situation nor a signed writing on which to base a conclusion 
that her performance was a work-for-hire.120  
Judge N.R. Smith dissented from Kozinski’s ruling, reasoning that 
“Garcia does not clearly have a copyright interest in her acting performance, 
                                                                                                            
requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) against YouTube, that request was denied, and the TRO 
“[a]pplication was construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction.” Id.  
112 Garcia, 2012 WL 12878355, at *2.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. (“Garcia does not argue that she is the sole author of the Film, nor does she argue that the 
Film was a joint work of which she was a co-author.”).  
115 Id. at *1 (“Nor has Garcia established a likelihood of success on the merits. Even assuming both 
that Garcia’s individual performance in the Film is copyrightable and that she has not released this 
copyright interest, the nature of this copyright interest is not clear.”).  
116 Id.  
117 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), dissolved by, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(en banc).  
118 Id. at 933. But oddly by injunctive relief standards, Judge Kozinski recognized that Garcia’s 
claim was “fairly debatable.” Id. at 935. 
119 Id. at 937–38. 
120 Id. at 936–37. 
 
 24 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1 
because (1) her acting performance is not a work, (2) she is not an author, 
and (3) her acting performance is too personal to be fixed.”121 It is worth 
considering these points in reverse order. 
Judge Smith seems to have gotten the notion that an “acting performance 
is too personal to be fixed” from a misreading of the Ninth Circuit’s 1988 
case Midler v. Ford Motor Co.122 In that litigation, Ford had obtained a 
license to use the musical composition “Do You Want to Dance” in a 
commercial. When Bette Midler rebuffed Ford’s offer to do the commercial, 
Ford “studiously acquire[d] the services of a sound-alike and instruct[ed] her 
to imitate . . . Midler's voice.”123 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Midler’s 
California law “sound-alike” claim was not preempted by federal copyright 
law, offering that “[a] voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not ‘fixed.’ 
What is put forward . . . here is more personal than any work of 
authorship.”124 Judge Smith misunderstood this statement, morphing it into 
the conclusion that “Ninth Circuit precedent dictates that a vocalist’s singing 
of the song is not copyrightable.”125 The dissent then applied that 
misunderstanding of Midler to Garcia, concluding that “one actress’s 
individual acting performance in the movie, like a vocalist singing a song, 
‘is more personal than any work of authorship.’ As a result, it is not fixed.”126  
This profoundly misunderstands the Midler case because Bette Midler 
was not suing on a particular fixation of her singing—that is, any particular 
sound recording. Midler could not bring such a suit under the Copyright Act 
because under § 114, the derivative work right in sound recordings “is 
limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds 
fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in 
sequence or quality.”127 In other words, the statute bars a “sound-alike” 
claim based on a copyrighted sound recording. Instead, Midler claimed that 
her vocal characteristics and style had been slavishly copied in a violation 
                                                                                                            
121 Id. at 941 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
122 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).  
123 Id. at 463. 
124 Id.  
125 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 945 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Midler, 849 F.2d at 462).  
126 Id. (citation omitted). Of course, the idea that something is “too personal” to be a work of 
authorship is arguably at odds with Justice Holmes’ equation of personal expression with original 
expression. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“Personality 
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest 
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright 
unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.”). While courts have not questioned Holmes’ 
statement, scholars have pondered its meaning. See Beebe, supra note 75, at 330 (reasoning that Holmes 
used “personality” as the threshold for originality driven by an “everyman”—distinctively American 
romanticism); Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s Copyright—Photograph as Art, Photograph as 
Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 369 (2012) (discussing Justice Holmes’s use of “personality” as 
both a synonym and source of originality). 
127 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012).   
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of her common law right of publicity. The case does not hold that “a 
vocalist’s singing of [a] song is not copyrightable” because Midler was not 
suing on the basis of any fixed sound recording.128 Indeed, a vocalist’s 
singing of a song is copyrightable, even if there is no instrumental 
accompaniment, no sound engineering, and no post-production. Cindy 
Garcia was suing on reproduction of her own performance, not a “look-
alike” or “act-alike.” While Judge Smith’s peculiar analysis did not survive 
in the en banc decision, it may have influenced the en banc majority’s own 
distorted statements on fixation, described below.  
The dissent’s second critique of Garcia’s claim was simply that she was 
“not an author.”129 This assertion was based on the Ninth Circuit’s 2000 
Aalmuhammed v. Lee130 decision and its framework for distinguishing joint 
authors from other contributors. In Aalmuhammed, a Ninth Circuit panel 
denied joint authorship to a consultant on the film Malcolm X who had 
“suggested extensive script revisions,” principally “to ensure the religious 
and historical accuracy and authenticity of scenes depicting Malcolm X’s 
religious conversion and pilgrimage to Mecca.”131 Judge Smith cited a series 
of Aalmuhammed indicia to establish that Garcia could not be an author: (a) 
an author is “the originator or the person who causes something to come into 
being”;132 (b) an author is the “person with creative control”;133 (c) an author 
is “he to whom anything owes its origin”;134 and (d) “an author might also 
be ‘the invent[or] or master mind’ who ‘creates or gives effect to the 
idea.’”135 Part IV will address the problems with Aalmuhammed. Suffice 
here to say that by some of these tests, an actor will be an author—the actor 
is certainly the performing artist that “causes something to come into being” 
and the actor certainly “give[s] effect to the idea[s]” of the scriptwriter and 
the director. These notions are explored further in Part III.B. In a footnote, 
Judge Smith seems to recognize that Garcia might be a joint author with 
Youssef,136 suggesting that the dissent was really using these tests to argue 
that Garcia could not be the exclusive author of anything, a required basis 
for her claimed injunctive relief.  
                                                                                                            
128 Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.  
129 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 941 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
130 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000). 
131 Id. at 1230.  
132 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 942 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. (quoting Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233). 
135 Id. (quoting Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234). 
136 Id. at 942 n.3 (“Garcia’s interest in her acting performance may best be analyzed as a joint work 
with Youssef, considering she relied on Youssef’s script, equipment, and direction.”); see also id. (citing 
17 U.S.C. § 101) (defining “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention 
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole”). 
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Finally, there is Judge Smith’s first concern about Garcia’s claim: that 
“her acting performance [was] not a work” and that “[t]o be protected, 
Garcia’s acting performance must be a ‘work.’”137 This is a legitimate issue 
and arguably the most vexing problem in the Garcia litigation, but again the 
analysis quickly went off the doctrinal rails. After reciting § 102(b), which 
bars copyright protection of ideas, processes, methods of operation, and 
discoveries,138 the dissent reasoned that an acting performance resembles the 
“procedure” or “process” by which “an original work” is performed. 
Therefore, “[i]n no case does copyright protection” extend to an acting 
performance, “regardless of the form in which it is described, illustrated, or 
embodied in” the original work.139 
It is not clear what it means to say that a dramatic or musical 
performance would “resemble” a “procedure” or “process,” except as a 
misunderstanding of these latter two terms. What would it mean to say that 
Nina Simone’s recorded performance and David Bowie’s separate recorded 
performance of the musical composition Wild is the Wind were each a 
“procedure” or “process”? A “procedure” or “process” of that musical 
composition? If we could make any sense of this view, it would likely 
undermine copyright protection of sound recordings. There was thankfully 
no trace of this bizarre characterization of performances140 in the subsequent 
en banc ruling. 
Doctrinal missteps aside, we could describe the disagreement between 
Judge Kozinski and Judge Smith as David Nimmer does: “The flash-point 
between the majority and dissent focused on whether the plaintiff could 
show copyright ownership.”141 To refine this, the plaintiff needed to show 
exclusive ownership of something protected by copyright. As the subjects of 
protection in American copyright law are “works of authorship,” we are 
inevitably drawn to the question of whether a dramatic performance could 
be a “work” under Title 17. If not, how could there be a protectable interest 
controlled exclusively by the plaintiff? Concerning these questions, Jane 
Ginsburg has noted that Judge Kozinski’s opinion stood “for the proposition 
                                                                                                            
137 Id. at 941. 
138 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”). 
139 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 942 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
140 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12(B)(2) (2018) 
[hereinafter NIMMER & NIMMER] (“[Such a] construction does violence to the structure of the 
[Copyright] Act. Congress expressly disallowed protection for various productions, such as methods of 
operation and ideas. Those matters stand poles apart from performances, which constitute the essence of 
works that Congress expressly embraced within the realm of copyright . . . .”). 
141 David Nimmer, Innocence of Copyright: An Inquiry into the Public Interest, 63 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 367, 396 (2016). 
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that audiovisual performances could be the subject matter of individual 
copyrights owned by the individual actor.”142 
Criticism of Judge Kozinski’s opinion was fast and furious, particularly 
from those who generally oppose recognition of copyright rights.143 A 
petition for re-hearing en banc was filed and granted on November 12, 
2014.144 The case was reargued in December 2014 before eleven of the 
twenty-two active judges on the Ninth Circuit,145 with an en banc decision 
issued the following May. 
Writing for the en banc majority, Judge McKeown concluded that the 
law and facts did not favor “Garcia’s claim to a copyright in her five-second 
acting performance as it appears in Innocence of Muslims.”146 Later, in the 
discussion of the standards for injunctive relief, the majority opinion 
describes Garcia’s claims as “based upon a dubious and unprecedented 
theory of copyright.”147 McKeown’s opinion for the majority gives us some 
distinct and separate reasons for these conclusions. 
First, while the Garcia en banc opinion did not repeat Judge Smith’s 
“acting performance is too personal to be fixed” argument, it did offer its 
                                                                                                            
142 Ginsburg, supra note 110. 
143 See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, Copyright Ruling in US May Impair Free Speech, INTELL. PROP. 
WATCH (Apr. 14, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/historical/689/ (“[T]he ruling 
significantly alters US law in a manner that will greatly restrict free speech.”); Mike Masnick, Horrific 
Appeals Court Ruling Says Actress Has Copyright Interest In 'Innocence Of Muslims,' Orders YouTube 
To Delete Every Copy, TECHDIRT (Feb. 26, 2014, 12:29 PM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140226/12103626359/horrific-appeals-court-ruling-says-actress-
has-copyright-interest-innocence-muslims-orders-youtube-to-delete-every-copy.shtml (“Almost 
everything about Kozinski's ruling here is troubling. The copyright interpretation just seems very far out 
of bounds with just about everything having to do with copyright law.”); Venkat Balasubramani, In Its 
“Innocence of Muslims” Ruling, the Ninth Circuit is Guilty of Judicial Activism—Garcia v. Google, 
TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2014), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/02/in-its-
innocence-of-muslims-ruling-the-ninth-circuit-is-guilty-of-judicial-activism-garcia-v-google.htm 
(“This starts to look . . . like a variation on the heckler’s veto. It’s certainly not very speech friendly to 
take an expansive view of copyright in connection with takedown requests that are prompted by threats 
of violence.”); Corynne McSherry, Bad Facts, Really Bad Law: Court Orders Google to Censor 
Controversial Video Based on Spurious Copyright Claim, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 26, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/bad-facts-really-bad-law-court-orders-google-censor-
controversial-video-based (“We're hard-pressed to think of a better example of copyright maximalism 
trumping free speech.”).  
144 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647, 647 (9th Cir. 2014). 
145 The en banc case was heard by Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Judges Alex Kozinski, M. 
Margaret McKeown, Marsha S. Berzon, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Richard R. Clifton, Consuelo M. 
Callahan, N. Randy Smith, Mary H. Murguia, Morgan Christen and Paul J. Watford. As of August 2018, 
there were 22 active judges on the Ninth Circuit, one of whom has been appointed by President Trump. 
Active Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, U.S. CTS. FOR NINTH CIR., 
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view_active_senior_judges.php (last visited Sept. 22, 2018). 
Judge Kozinski resigned from the court in late 2017 and by April 2018 Judge Clifton had taken senior 
status, so that in late 2014, the court would have had slightly more than the present twenty-two active 
judges.  
146 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). 
147 Id. at 747. 
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own troubling analysis of the “fixation” issue. Judge McKeown reasoned 
that Garcia “never fixed her acting performance in a tangible medium of 
expression” because “[f]or better or for worse, Youssef and his crew ‘fixed’ 
Garcia’s performance in the tangible medium, whether in physical film or in 
digital form. However one might characterize Garcia’s performance, she 
played no role in fixation.”148  
This portion of the opinion is worth discussion because it could easily 
be misconstrued by district courts and novice practitioners. Film directors 
also do not themselves fix their work; neither do the legal persons we call 
film studios. Fixation is literally done by camerapersons and 
cinematographers. A rapper who freestyles before a videographer he hired 
does not fail the fixation requirement because the rapper is busy rapping. 
The same holds true for any musician in a recording studio where the sound 
engineer behind the glass wall is controlling the recording equipment. Case 
law—none of it cited by the Garcia III decision—makes it abundantly clear 
that all this is done “by or under the authority of the author” as long as the 
person doing the recording is not interfering with the original expression of 
the director, performing artist, map designer, or chief programmer.149 
Garcia knew her performance was being recorded and intended her 
performance to be recorded—which is the same as Diana Krall in a music 
studio recording When I Look in Your Eyes or Guillermo del Toro directing 
cinematographer Dan Laustsen to capture the shots he wants in The Shape 
of Water. We could salvage Judge McKeown’s comments here if we treat 
her conclusion as dependent on the fact that Garcia had been defrauded—
Garcia never agreed to the fixation and the fixation could not be “under her 
authority.”  
Judge McKeown added this point to the analysis,150 but she clearly 
seemed to think that Garcia’s failure to meet the fixation requirement did not 
                                                                                                            
148 Id. at 743–44. 
149 Lindsay v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248 (HB), 1999 WL 
816163, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999) (“The fact that Lindsay did not literally perform the filming, i.e. 
by diving to the wreck and operating the cameras, will not defeat his claims of having ‘authored’ the 
illuminated footage.”); Andrien v. S. Ocean Cty. Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir. 
1991); Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that authors may be entitled 
to copyright protection even if they do not “perform with their own hands the mechanical tasks of putting 
the material into the form distributed to the public”). See also Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Sol’s, 
Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the programmer’s work was insufficiently original for 
authorship where he was told “specifically what to do and how to do it”); JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, 
Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d, 482 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2007); Kyjen Co. v. Vo-
Toys, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1068–69 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (explaining that parties that translated sketches 
into toys are not co-authors); Hughes, Right of Fixation, supra note 53, at 415 (2015) (stating that the 
1976 Act fixation requirement was preceded by a publication requirement in 1909, which definitely 
meant publication by third parties). 
150 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 744 (“On top of this, Garcia claims that she never agreed to the film’s 
ultimate rendition or how she was portrayed in Innocence of Muslims, so she can hardly argue that the 
film or her cameo in it was fixed ‘by or under [her] authority.’”). 
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depend on fraud.151 Yet in a sensible copyright analysis, absent fraud or a 
similar exigent circumstance, when a performer agrees to have her 
performance recorded—whether she is a singer, dancer, or actor—we should 
consider that the fixation is made under her authority. In short, this part of 
the en banc majority opinion helped inspire Judge Watford to note, in 
concurrence, that “much of what the majority says about copyright law may 
be wrong.”152 
The majority was on firmer ground in its discussion of the problematic 
determination of what a “work” would be for Garcia to succeed in her claim. 
On this question, the Garcia en banc majority opinion relies on a March 6, 
2014 letter from the U.S. Copyright Office that “found that Garcia’s 
performance was not a copyrightable work.”153 This is a fair characterization 
of the letter’s conclusions. Not surprisingly, the Copyright Office had said 
that “for copyright registration purposes, a motion picture is a single 
integrated work”154 and that, assuming Garcia’s contribution was “limited to 
her acting performance,”155 the office could not “register her performance 
apart from the motion picture.”156  
That letter had also stated that “an actor . . . in a motion picture is either 
a joint author in the entire work or, as most often is the case, is not an author 
at all by virtue of a work made for hire agreement”; that “an actor’s . . . 
performance in the making of a motion picture is an integrated part of the 
resulting work, the motion picture as a whole”; and that “[i]f her contribution 
                                                                                                            
151 Id. The clause “[o]n top of this” indicates that the lack of fixation conclusion does not turn on 
Garcia “never agree[ing] to the film’s ultimate rendition or how she was portrayed.” Id. The opinion 
states elsewhere that it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude Garcia impliedly 
licensed the use of the fixation (and, so, implicitly that Garcia agreed to the fixation itself). Id. at 743 
n.12 (“[T]he district court found that Garcia granted Youssef a non-exclusive implied license to use her 
performance in the film. Although Garcia asked Youssef about Desert Warrior’s content, she in no way 
conditioned the use of her performance on Youssef’s representations. On this record, we cannot disturb 
the district court’s finding as clearly erroneous.”). 
152 Id. at 747 (Watford, J., concurring). Not surprisingly, others have discussed the weirdly wrong 
discussion of fixation in the Garcia en banc majority opinion. See Randal Picker, Garcia v. Google 
(Again): Fixing Copyright?, MEDIA INST. (June 5, 2015), 
https://www.mediainstitute.org/2015/06/05/garcia-v-google-again-fixing-copyright/ (describing the 
Garcia III majority discussion of fixation as a “quagmire” and concluding “Garcia . . . only participated 
in the creation of a brief film clip . . . . [T]he work associated with that clip would be fixed under Garcia’s 
authority.”); Sarah Howes, Creative Equity: A Practical Approach to the Actor’s Copyright, 42 
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 70, 83 (2016) (criticizing the Garcia III interpretation of the “fixation” 
requirement).  
153 Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 752 (describing the Letter from Robert J. Kasunic, Associate Register of 
Copyrights & Dir. of Registration Policy & Practices, U.S. Copyright Office, to M. Cris Armenta, 
Counsel to Cindy Garcia (Mar. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Kasunic Letter]). 
154 Id. at 741 (quoting the Kasunic Letter). The Kasunic Letter was itself quoting Letter from Laura 
Lee Fischer, Chief of the Performing Arts Div. of the Registration Program at the U.S. Copyright Office, 
to M. Cris Armenta, Counsel to Cindy Garcia (Dec. 18, 2012). 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
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was not as a work made for hire, she may assert a claim in joint authorship 
in the motion picture, but not sole authorship of her performance in a portion 
of the work.”157 In short, the 2014 Copyright Office letter is consistent with 
the Compendium in assuming that an actor’s dramatic performance can be 
original expression protectable by copyright once it is fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression. Indeed, in oral argument, counsel for Google had 
agreed to that proposition,158 arguing instead that “[t]here is no precedent, 
zero, for the idea that this, a five second performance is itself a separate 
copyrightable work.”159 The problem for Garcia was that her original 
expression was inextricably intermingled with the expressive work of 
others—it never had an independent existence as its own work. 
But in the Garcia majority opinion this sensible problem of what 
constitutes a “work” often seems mixed with—and overshadowed by—fear 
of an unmanageable system of copyright claims: “Garcia’s theory of 
copyright law would result in the legal morass we warned against in 
Aalmuhammed—splintering a movie into many different ‘works,’ even in 
the absence of an independent fixation. Simply put, as Google claimed, it 
‘make[s] Swiss cheese of copyrights.’”160 Recounting films with large casts 
of extras, the court warned that “[t]reating every acting performance as an 
independent work would not only be a logistical and financial nightmare, it 
would turn cast of thousands into . . . copyright of thousands.”161 This fear 
of “cherry-picking” copyrights was also on display when the court cautioned 
that Garcia’s theory “would enable any contributor from a costume designer 
down to an extra or best boy to claim copyright in random bits and pieces of 
a unitary motion picture without satisfying the requirements of the 
Copyright Act.”162 Part IV will further consider this problem. 
But on the issue of where and how to draw the line on a “work,” the 
Garcia decision does point to something worth exploring. The court’s 
driving concern was about “splintering a movie into many different ‘works,’ 
even in the absence of an independent fixation.”163 It is that last concept—
“independent fixation” that deserves our attention.164 As the court properly 
noted, in Effects Associates v. Cohen, the disputed special-effects footage 
had been “independently fixed” and no one disputed the plaintiff’s copyright 
                                                                                                            
157 Id. at 752 (quoting the Kasunic Letter).  
158 Oral argument at 25:30, Garcia III, 
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000006884 (“The [AVP] treaty simply 
says performances can be copyrightable; we don’t disagree with that . . . .” ); id. at 25:37 (“We agree that 
a performer could have a copyrightable interest in a film. It is normally as a joint author.”).  
159 Id. at 24:55. 
160 Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 742. 
161 Id. at 743. 
162 Id. at 737. 
163 Id. at 742. 
164 Id. 
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over that footage.165 The same is true of musical compositions and sound 
recordings used in film soundtracks as well as paintings, prints, sculptures, 
models, backdrops, and copyrightable costumes that appear on screen. As 
for the hairstylists mentioned in Aalmuhammed, hair styles are akin to 
tattoos166—they do have an independent existence, and with enough hair 
spray, are definitely fixed.167 In short, films are already compendiums of 
independently fixed original expression and our intuitions and copyright 
metaphysics are comfortable understanding those things as “works.” 
Echoing the Copyright Office letter, the Garcia en banc majority correctly 
emphasized that “[w]e in no way foreclose copyright protection” for 
“standalone works that are separately fixed and incorporated into a film.”168 
This raises one more issue in the case: instead of Garcia’s claim being 
over her performance, she could have more credibly claimed copyright in 
the particular take of her scene that was used in the Innocence of Muslims. 
Assuming Youssef did his filming in a fairly normal way, he, Garcia, and 
the film crew would have shot Garcia’s scene separately from others. At that 
moment, if all other production on Innocence of Muslims had stopped, no 
one would question that there was a bona fide copyright in the audiovisual 
scenes shot. At that moment, the filmed scene was a “standalone work that 
[was] separately fixed” as it awaited being “incorporated into a film . . . .”169  
                                                                                                            
165 See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that enhancement 
of a film through special-effects required compensation to Effects Associates, the owner of the 
copyright). 
166 Warner Brothers quickly settled a lawsuit over its unauthorized reproduction and use in the film 
Hangover II of a tattoo by tattoo artist Victor Witmill. Verified Complaint for Injunctive & Other Relief, 
Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, 4:11-cv-00752 (D. Mo. April 28, 2011). See also Noam Cohen, 
On Tyson’s Face, It’s Art. On Film, a Legal Issue, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/business/media/21tattoo.html; Matthew Belloni, Warner Bros. 
Settles ‘Hangover II’ Tattoo Lawsuit, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (June 20, 2011, 1:39 PM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/warner-bros-settles-hangover-ii-203377. 
167 It would be hard to deny that some hairdos are sculptural works. See, for example, the “Martian 
Girl” or “Martian Madame” in MARS ATTACKS! (Warner Bros. 1996). Mars Attacks! - Martian Girl, 
YOUTUBE (June 7, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XDAaTzccCik.  
168 Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 744 n.13 (“The Copyright Office draws a distinction between acting 
performances like Garcia’s, which are intended to be an inseparable part of an integrated film, and 
standalone works that are separately fixed and incorporated into a film. We in no way foreclose copyright 
protection for the latter—any ‘discrete work in itself that is later incorporated into a motion picture,’ as 
the Copyright Office put it.”). 
169 In fact, this was the conclusion reached by the court regarding “raw footage” in 16 Casa Duse 
v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 259 (2d Cir. 2015). The appellate panel readily (and correctly) acknowledged 
that this raw film footage had its own copyright. Id. (citations omitted) (“[T]he film footage is subject to 
copyright protection. An original motion picture is surely a ‘work of authorship’ in which copyright 
protection ‘subsists’ under the Copyright Act. And ‘where a work is prepared over a period of time, the 
portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time.’ The unedited 
film footage at issue in this case seems to us to be an early version of the finished product, constituting 
the film ‘as of that time.’ Because ‘the Copyright Act [ ] affords protection to each work at the moment 
of its creation,’ copyright subsists even in such an unfinished work.”). 
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Of course, this would not have helped Garcia because Youssef and 
perhaps others would also have a claim of joint authorship to that scene. But 
we can imagine recorded dramatic scenes in which the sole original 
expression comes from the dramatic performance—in those cases, copyright 
in the recorded scene comes very close to being just a fixed performance. 
Part III.A will explore this further. 
It is worth adding that if you believe that while there might have been a 
copyright in Garcia’s scene as a “standalone work[] that [was] separately 
fixed,”170 but that copyright disappeared when the scene was integrated into 
the film, then by the same reasoning, does the copyright in all the individual 
“cells” painted for a classic animation like Fantasia (1940), Spirited Away 
(2001), or The Iron Giant (1999) disappear when the cells are integrated into 
the final film?  
A few years out, the impact of the en banc Garcia decision on the 
question of actors-as-authors has been muted. For example, one copyright 
newsletter led off its discussion of the case saying “[a]n en banc panel of the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief because Garcia has no 
copyright in her acting performance,”171 but then still advised that 
“performers may sometimes be joint authors of the entire work.”172 There 
have certainly been some arguable decisions bolstered by language from 
Garcia, the most dramatic being the Second Circuit’s extraordinary 
conclusion in 16 Casa Duse v. Merkin that the principal director of a film 
was not an author of that film.173 Otherwise, courts seem to recognize both 
the unusual fact pattern of Garcia and the limited precedential value of its 
analysis.174 To date, it looks like Judge Watford was correct that on these 
questions of copyright law, the court would have been better off “leaving the 
task of crafting broad new rules for a case in which it is actually necessary 
to do so.”175  
But one lesson from the litigation bears repeating. In Garcia v. Google, 
one of the arguments that Google initially raised in its defense was that an 
actor’s performance could never rise to the level of authorship because the 
                                                                                                            
170 Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 750 (alteration in original).  
171 Copyright Law Journal, Volume XXIX, No. 5 (Neil Boorstyn, ed.) (Sept.–Oct. 2015) at 52. 
172 Id. at 54. 
173 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 264.  
174 See, e.g., Mallon v. Mitchell, 224 F. Supp. 3d 97, 103 (D. Mass. 2016) (“Dr. Mallon cites [Garcia 
III] for its assertion that treating each iteration or edit of a complicated work as a separate copyrightable 
work would ‘make Swiss cheese of copyrights.’ This court appreciates the concerns raised in Garcia, but 
does not read those concerns to mean that the cheese can never be divided. Here, it is sliced into two 
logical portions.”); see also Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co. Ltd., No. 3:15-cv-
04084-CRB, 2017 WL 2118342, at *10 n.27 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2017) (“Garcia [III] held an actress did 
not have a copyright interest in a five-second acting performance that was incorporated into a film . . . 
[and that] [a]lthough the case concerned a fleeting acting performance, Garcia [III]’s holding arguably 
denies copyright protection to any ‘inseparable contribution[] integrated into a single work.’”). 
175 Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 748 (Watford J., concurring).  
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actor works under a film director and “the creator of a work at another’s 
direction, without contributing intellectual modification, is not an author.”176 
Early on, Google expressly argued that Garcia could not be an author 
because she “had no creative control over the script or her performance[,]”177 
in short, a theory that dramatic performers are puppets on strings.178  
By the end of the litigation, this argument had disappeared: the 
Copyright Office letter, Google counsel in oral argument, and the Garcia en 
banc opinions (majority and dissent) all agreed that dramatic performances 
can be original expression that make actors eligible to be authors of the 
works in which those performances are integrated. The few commentators 
who have interpreted Garcia III as a complete repudiation of copyright 
interests in dramatic performances179 are simply wrong.  
D. Views from the Ivory Tower 
Demonstrating that the interest of courts does impact the work of 
scholars180 there has been relatively little scholarly commentary on the 
question of actors as authors. In the Fleet v. CBS litigation, CBS’s appellate 
brief claimed that “[a]ll commentators and case authority agree that an 
actors’ performance in a film has the requisite degree of artistic creativity to 
be a work protected by copyright law.”181 But the supporting footnote to this 
claim referred to one passage in McCarthy’s right of publicity treatise and 
nothing more.182  
The footnote citing McCarthy’s treatise states that “performance[s] from 
a script like a performance of a stage play from a script, are works of 
authorship under copyright law[,]” contrasting those with uncopyrightable 
                                                                                                            
176 Google Inc. and YouTube, LLC’s Brief in Response to Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc at 29, 
Garcia, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-57302) [hereinafter Brief in Response to Suggestion] 
(citation omitted); see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2014), dissolved by, 786 
F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“Google argues that Garcia didn’t make a protectible contribution to 
the film because Youssef wrote the dialogue she spoke, managed all aspects of the production and later 
dubbed over a portion of her scene.”). 
177 Brief in Response to Suggestion, supra note 176, at 28 (citation omitted).  
178 The phrase comes from an amici brief in the case jointly authored by the author. Balganesh et 
al. Brief, supra note 65, at 7.  
179 See, e.g. Howes, supra note 152, at 76 (“[The] Ninth Circuit en banc panel said actors have no 
copyright interest in the films they make.”). 
180 The reverse may not be true. Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law 
Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/us/19bar.html; 
see also Richard A. Posner, Against the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFF. (Nov./Dec. 2004), 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2004/review_posner_novdec04.msp 
(describing law reviews as “a world where inexperienced editors make articles about the wrong topics 
worse”). 
181 Respondents’ Opening Brief at *13–14, Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 
July 1, 1996).  
182 Id. at n.21 (citing J. T. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY, 11-77 to 11-78 (1995)). 
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athletic performances.183 In his treatise on copyright law, Paul Goldstein 
believes “[a]t bottom, the question of copyright in sports events is the 
question whether copyright can attach to fixed but unscripted postures and 
movements.”184 Formulated that way, Goldstein concludes that “the better 
result . . . is to hold that the movements of players on the field, if original, 
constitute copyrightable expression.”185 Goldstein is certainly right that we 
would consider the unscripted postures and movements of a dancer or a 
performance artist to be copyrightable, but there is still disagreement on 
whether an athlete who runs to catch a ball lodged deep into right field is 
“expressing.”  
David Nimmer agrees that “Congress intended to include within the 
realm of protectable subject matter innumerable performances of many 
sorts,”186 but, in the shadow of the Garcia decision, he also concludes that 
“it makes no sense to invoke an additional category of protection, namely 
performance.”187 For Nimmer, “performances should not be written out of 
the firmament as legitimate components of copyrightable expression,” but 
“performances should be recognized as subject to copyright only as part of 
a separate categor[y] of protection, such as motion pictures or sound 
recordings.”188 Nimmer concludes that the en banc majority in Garcia 
correctly “recognized a performance as being an element of works 
potentially subject to copyright protection, but not as a stand-alone category 
that itself deserves recognition.”189 
All in all, there is very little separating these perspectives. If there is a 
contrast between Nimmer’s position and that in the Goldstein and McCarthy 
treatises, it seems to stem from not imagining the simplest case of all: one 
where the only protectable expression in an audiovisual work is the dramatic 
performance. Part III.A presents a thought experiment of this sort. In such a 
case, copyright protection of the audiovisual work essentially boils down to 
copyright protection of the dramatic performance, just as copyright 
protection of a sound recording that has not been subject to sound 
engineering essentially boils down to copyright protection of the musical 
performance.  
                                                                                                            
183 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[B]y comparison, ‘a live prize fight, baseball game, 
horse race or Olympic competition’ are unpredictable and not performed from a script, and thus are not 
copyrightable; baseball players' performance and performance of a human cannon ball are events that do 
not have the requisite degree of creativity to be protected under copyright[.]”). 
184 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12.1, at 2:142 (3d ed. 2018).  
185 Id. 
186 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12(B)(2), at 2-174.1 (2018). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at § 2.12(B)(4), at 2-181.  
189 Id. at § 2.12(B)(3), at 2-178.  
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III. A STRAIGHTFORWARD ORIGINALITY ANALYSIS 
In 1998, Judi Dench won the Academy Award for Best Supporting 
Actress for her eight-minute performance as Queen Elizabeth I in 
Shakespeare in Love.190 Twenty-two years earlier—in 1966—Beatrice 
Straight won the Oscar for Best Supporting Actress for an even shorter (six-
minute) performance in Network.191 In 2009, Viola Davis was nominated in 
the same category for a stunning single scene in the film Doubt.192 By one 
of Google’s early theories in the Garcia litigation, these performances 
cannot be “original expression” because the actor worked “at another’s 
direction, without contributing intellectual modification.”193 This “puppets-
on-strings” theory of dramatic acting should strike the copyright-conversant 
reader as wildly contrary to American copyright law’s fundamental 
principles. 
Despite the occasional sturm und drang about “Romantic” authorship 
from legal scholars, American law has historically been characterized by a 
very low originality threshold for copyright protection.194 In 1991, a 
unanimous Supreme Court in Feist reminded us that the requisite level of 
creativity for original expression is “extremely low; even a slight amount 
will suffice.”195 But at the other end of the twentieth century, Justice Holmes 
has already given us the formulation that should govern whether dramatic 
                                                                                                            
190 Adam B. Vary, Should Judi Dench Keep Her ‘Shakespeare in Love’ Oscar?, ENT. WKLY. (Dec. 
29, 2008 12:00 PM), http://ew.com/article/2008/12/29/recall-98spactr/.  
191 Id. 
192 Kate Kellaway, Mother Superior, GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2009/jan/04/doubt-viola-davis (“Davis is only on screen for 11 
minutes but to watch her is to understand an entire life. It is an [a]bject lesson in what an actor can convey 
in a short space of time. She seems to carry her family history in her face: the violence at home and her 
unswerving love for her child. And she looks dowdily embattled but unassailable in her shabby fawn 
overcoat . . . . It is no surprise that she has already been nominated for a Golden Globe as best supporting 
actress and is tipped to win an Oscar.”); Rudie Obias, 12 Actors Who Earned Oscar Nods for Less Than 
20 Minutes of Screen Time, MENTAL FLOSS (Jan. 16, 2016), http://mentalfloss.com/article/73865/12-
actors-who-earned-oscar-nods-less-20-minutes-screen-time (“[E]stimates range from five to eight 
minutes, but Davis made the most of every second, decimating the screen as the mother of a young boy 
who may or may not have been molested. She managed to hold her own opposite Meryl Streep (who 
earned a Best Actress nod for the role) and competed against her Doubt co-star Amy Adams for Best 
Supporting Actress in 2009.”).  
193 Brief in Response to Suggestion, supra note 176, at 29 (citation omitted).  
194 See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship, 41 
DUKE L.J. 455 (1991); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail 
and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1527 (1992) (“The values of romantic authorship seem to 
seep—consciously or unconsciously—into economic analysis. And because in most conflicts the 
paradigm of authorship tends to fit one side better than the other, this romantic grounding provides 
economic analysis with at least the illusion of certainty. Authors tend to win.”). For an analysis and 
response to some of the claims made about the pervasiveness of the “Romantic author” idea, see generally 
Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998). 
195 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  
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performances can be copyrightable original expression: “Personality always 
contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, 
and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one 
man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction 
in the words of the act.”196 
When Holmes wrote these words, we were just crossing the 
technological frontier into a world in which dramatic performances could be 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression—the Lumiere Brothers and 
Thomas Edison had debuted their respective “moving pictures” technologies 
only a few years before. Now that the fixation of dramatic performances is 
a familiar element of life, any “puppet-on-strings” view of acting necessarily 
says that while Holmes may have thought handwriting was an act of 
individual expression that could attract copyright protection (and we have 
no case law disagreeing), dramatic acting is not.  
This is not to deny that some dramatic performances may be so de 
minimis that they do not cross a minimal threshold for the amount of original 
expression.197 Nor is this to deny that some “acting” may be so mechanical 
or robotic as to lack original expression. But our general presumption should 
be that a dramatic performance is the personal, original expression of the 
actor, so when the performance is fixed in a tangible medium it is a proper 
subject of copyright protection. 
Does this simple formulation get us into the problem that seemed to vex 
so many in Garcia v. Google? Does it make a “performance” into a “work”? 
No—or, not necessarily. And when it does, that should not be troubling. The 
problem is best explored with thought experiments that will hopefully 
increase our confidence about dramatic performances as copyrightable 
original expression. 
A. Some Thought Experiments 
As inspiring as the “The Star-Spangled Banner” is, when it comes to 
odes to a nation and all it might represent, “America the Beautiful” is a near-
perfect song. As a musical composition, “America the Beautiful” has an 
unusual history. The melody was composed by Samuel A. Ward as a hymn 
                                                                                                            
196 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).  
197 As Benjamin Kaplan wrote in his classic exposition on copyright: “[T]o make the copyright 
turnstile revolve, the author should have to deposit more than a penny in the box.” BENJAMIN KAPLAN, 
AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 46 (1967); see also COMPENDIUM, supra note 60, at § 313.4(C) 
(noting single words and short textual phrases are not copyrightable), § 802.5(B) (“[S]hort musical 
phrases are not copyrightable because they lack a sufficient amount of authorship.”), and § 803.5(B) 
(“Short sound recordings may lack a sufficient amount of authorship to be copyrightable.”); Justin 
Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 577 (2005) (explaining 
that generally “American courts have denied blatant claims that very small pieces of copyrightable 
material merit independent protection.”) 
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in 1882; that hymn was not published until a decade later in 1892.198 The 
lyrics were composed by Katherine Lee Bates as a poem entitled “Pike’s 
Peak” and first published in 1895.199 The two were first combined and 
published as “America the Beautiful” in 1910, seven years after Ward’s 
death.200 From all these dates, the musical composition is obviously in the 
public domain. 
Among the hundreds of millions of people who have sung “America the 
Beautiful” at one time or another, some have authorized that their 
performances be fixed in tangible mediums of expression. These sound 
recordings of “America the Beautiful” include renditions by Jim Brickman, 
Mariah Carey, Aretha Franklin, Whitney Houston, Royce Montgomery, 
Mickey Newbury, Elvis Presley, Charlie Rich, and the Mormon Tabernacle 
Choir.201 My personal favorites are Ray Charles’ many gorgeous recordings 
of the song. These sound recordings are all the more stunning because the 
visual tableau of Bates’ lyrics is brought to life by an artist who had been 
blind since the age of seven. 
Among the different occasions when Charles performed “America the 
Beautiful” (and it was recorded with his authorization) Charles had different 
accompaniments, ranging from a handful of gospel singers to a full orchestra 
with French horns and violins. But let’s consider a sound recording in which 
he sings solo, plays the piano, and is accompanied only by a snare drum 
keeping time. Let’s also stipulate that the recording is done with minimal 
sound engineering. 
Does Ray Charles’ performance on that sound recording—fixed with his 
authorization in a tangible medium of expression—embody sufficient 
originality to be protected by copyright? Is it “original expression” that 
crosses the “modicum of creativity” frontier? These are intended as 
rhetorical questions: a reader who thinks the answer is “no” will not be 
interested in the rest of this article. 
By eliminating all accompaniment but the snare drum and minimizing 
sound engineering, almost any originality or creativity we believe is in this 
sound recording is from Ray Charles. In these circumstances, there is no 
question that Congress intended that the performing artist could obtain a 
copyright in the sound recording and such copyright would, in effect, be a 
copyright in the performance. The House Report accompanying the 1976 
Act recognizes that there will be cases where the record producer’s 
contribution is so minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable 
                                                                                                            
198 LYNN SHERR, AMERICA THE BEAUTIFUL 48–52 (2001). 
199 Id. at 56. 
200 Id. at 59. 
201 A quick search of “America the Beautiful” on YouTube will provide recordings of the song by 
a myriad of artists, including those listed above. YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=america+the+beautiful (last visited Jan. 2, 2019).  
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element in the work, and there may be cases—for example, recordings of 
birdcalls, sounds of racing cars, etc.—where only the record producer’s 
contribution is copyrightable.202 
It would be hard to have clearer legislative history than this: the House 
Report says that protectable elements of a sound recording include the 
contribution “of the performers whose performance is captured”203 and that 
there will be “cases where . . . the performance is the only copyrightable 
element in the work.” 204 It is hard to avoid the conclusion that in these 
situations, Congress recognized that de facto the recorded performance 
would be the protected work. And we should keep in mind that according to 
the legislative history, “sound recordings” include non-musical 
performances like “[a]n actor’s recorded recitation of a poem” 205 or “a 
theatrical company’s recorded performance of a comedy.”206  
Now we move from the audio recording of an actor’s recitation of a 
poem to the realm of audiovisual works. Imagine that an admired actor—
Morgan Freeman, Ian McKellen, or J.K. Simmons207—does a 
Shakespearean soliloquy, i.e. a public domain work that is central to the 
Anglo-American repertoire in the same way that “America the Beautiful” is 
central to the American songbook. Let’s stipulate that the actor performs the 
soliloquy on an absolutely plain set—or in front of a “green screen”208 which 
the actor himself set up—with simple lighting and in front of a camera209 on 
a tripod. Let’s further stipulate that the actor himself activates the video 
camera on the tripod. In other words, we are minimizing any other creative 
inputs the same as we did with Ray Charles’ solo rendition of “America the 
Beautiful.” 
                                                                                                            
202 Copyright Act of 1976, H.R. 94-1476, 94th Cong. at 56 (1976), available at 
https://www.copyright.gov/history/law/clrev_94-1476.pdf 
203 Id.  
204 Id. 
205 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 184, §2.13, at 2:148. 
206 Id. 
207 Insert your own favored performer here. My extended list would include Viola Davis, Armie 
Hammer, Michael Peña, Chris Pine, Tilda Swinton, etc. 
208 “Chromakeying” is setting up a consistent, single color backdrop, typically bright green (for 
television) or blue (for feature films) and “keying” out that color so it does not register in the recording 
device; this allows one to substitute any background one wishes (or no background at all). Chuck Peters, 
How Does Green Screen Work?, VIDEOMAKER (Dec. 25, 2013), 
https://www.videomaker.com/article/c10/17026-how-does-green-screen-work.  
209 It might even be simply an iPhone. The indie film TANGERINE (Magnolia Pictures 2015) was 
shot entirely on an iPhone 5S. Nigel M. Smith, Tangerine Is a Big Deal, Not Just Because It Was Shot 
on an iPhone, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2015, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/film/2015/jul/10/tangerine-film-iphone-buddy-comedy-transgender-
prostitutes; Ramin Setoodeh, Sundance Premieres Sophisticated ‘Tangerine,’ Shot on iPhone 5s, 
VARIETY (Jan. 23, 2015, 6:52 PM), http://variety.com/2015/film/news/sundance-premieres-
sophisticated-tangerine-shot-on-iphone-5s-1201413692/.  
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It is not hard to imagine that a recorded performance of a soliloquy from 
Hamlet or Macbeth would be dramatic and impressive if done this way by 
an accomplished actor. And it is not hard to imagine that each actor would 
perform it in a substantially different way: indeed, that is the 
originality/creativity we would experience in their respective performances. 
If Justice Holmes was correct that “[p]ersonality always contains something 
unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest 
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone,”210 
then it is very hard to see how dramatic performances would not be a 
legitimate basis for copyright protection: the personal expression of a 
dramatic performance is “something [a person] may copyright unless there 
is a restriction in the words of the act.”211 And there are no such restrictions 
in the Copyright Act. 
As Jane Ginsburg has noted, “[i]f the performer of sounds produces the 
‘copyrightable elements’ comprised within a sound recording, it is hard to 
see why the performer of both sounds and physical gestures does not supply 
‘copyrightable elements’ in an audiovisual work.”212 But the reason for 
working through the subject this way is that normally, as Ginsburg observes, 
“separating an actor’s performance from the rest of the film seems an 
artificial exercise.”213 Imagining an actor’s performance as separate from an 
audiovisual work seems quite artificial compared to hearing an Aretha 
Franklin or David Bowie sound recording as Aretha Franklin or David 
Bowie, even though we know that those sound recordings typically involved 
other musicians, backup singers, sound engineers, technicians and 
producers. We can feel that we are hearing a single musician even when we 
know that, as Robert Brauneis says, our sound recordings are not 
“transparent recordings of real-time performances,”214 but “carefully 
constructed fictional audio experiences.”215 The same does not hold for our 
audiovisual experiences—hence the need for a reductionist thought 
experiment that eliminates the other potential sources of original expression.  
Staying with that thought experiment, would anyone say that the § 102 
“audiovisual work” that is a recording of the actor’s performance does not 
have a copyright because it didn’t have a traditional director, 
cinematographer, or set designer? Would we say that this audiovisual work 
does not have a copyright because the “script” was in the public domain? 
Clearly not: this minimalist audiovisual work of an actor performing a public 
                                                                                                            
210 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).  
211 Id.  
212 Ginsburg, supra note 110.  
213 Id.  
214 Robert Brauneis, Musical Work Copyright for the Era of Digital Sound Technology: Looking 
Beyond Composition and Performance, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 24–25 (2014). 
215 Id. at 18. For an example, in 2017, long-time Bowie collaborator Tony Visconti released a 
remixed/remastered—and quite different sounding—version of Bowie’s 1979 Lodger. DAVID BOWIE, 
LODGER (Tony Visconti Mix 2017).  
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domain work is capable of having copyright protection solely on the basis 
that the actor’s performance has that magical, but egalitarian “modicum of 
creativity.” 
At this juncture, we should change the public domain script into an 
original, copyrighted script. Does the new presence of the screenwriter’s 
original expression eliminate any original expression from the dramatic 
performer? It is hard to imagine the theory on which this happens. In fact, 
that is the nature of copyright in “cover” sound recordings when a musician 
performs a musical composition composed by someone else. Meshell 
Ndegeocello’s copyright in her 2018 sound recording of “Sometimes It 
Snows in April”216 is as secure as her copyright in her 1993 sound recording 
of “If That’s Your Boyfriend (He Wasn’t Last Night),”217 although Prince 
composed the former while Ndegeocello composed the latter.  
If we add a cinematographer and a lighting director to our minimalist 
audiovisual work, the right questions are if and how are these roles different 
in terms of original expressive contribution from what a sound engineer or 
a “mixer” add to a sound recording? We do not think that because Elvis 
Presley had the legendary sound engineer Bill Porter work on the sound 
recording of “Return to Sender” that Presley’s original expression in the 
sound recording is compromised.218  
One role we have not yet added is the “director”—and one could argue 
whether or not music “producers” are a standard counterpart in the world of 
sound recordings. A film or television director “is the person primarily 
responsible for supervising the creation of a film or television program”219 
and “the chief on-set decision maker”220 whose “function is to contribute to 
all of the creative elements of a film and to participate in molding and 
integrating them into one cohesive dramatic and aesthetic whole.”221 Now 
the question we asked before might have some traction: does the presence 
of a director for the audiovisual work eliminate any original expression from 
the actor? Google’s puppets-on-strings view of dramatic performances early 
in the Garcia litigation said “yes.” 
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Of course, there are audiovisual works in which the dramatic 
performances are puppets on strings—the marionettes in Team America: 
World Police (2004),222 directed by Trey Parker, and the 1960s 
Thunderbirds television series that directly inspired it.223 We can imagine a 
not too distant future in which the marionettes are replaced by programmable 
androids: when the director doesn’t get exactly the effect she wants, she can 
have the androids reprogrammed to deliver just the right wink of an eye, just 
the right curl to a smile, just the right stride across the room. More likely—
and we are partially there now224—the director can employ digital avatars, 
i.e. CGI “actors.” In all these examples, the director might have substantially 
more control over the final outcomes, the final original expression as a 
whole. 
But no director has complete control over human actors, whether they 
are acting in front of the camera, only lending their voices to CGI-created 
cartoon characters, or merely operating marionettes. And as we will see, 
within the realm of what a director can theoretically control, many directors 
cede substantial leeway to actors.  
B. Views Within the Acting Community 
Certainly, the acting community seems to believe that actors engage in 
a creative process, using the same terminology to describe what they do as 
writers and painters use to describe what they do. A classic text on acting, 
Uta Hagen’s A Challenge for the Actor, speaks of an actor as someone with 
a “need to express”225 and “a passion for self-expression,”226 someone who 
is intent “to produce a work of art”227 and does so in a “creative process”228 
by “revealing the myriad facets that spring from [her] own soul and 
imagination.”229 Hagen calls her own method-based approach to acting 
“realism” and describes it as executing a series of actions that “involve a 
                                                                                                            
222 TEAM AMERICA: WORLD POLICE (Scott Rudin Productions, Braniff Productions 2004). 
223 Thunderbirds (AP Films 1965–1966). 
224 Gregory Elwood, Motion Capture and Visual Effects Bring Back Tarkin for ‘Rogue One,’ L.A. 
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moment-to-moment subjective experience,”230 “weav[ing]” personal 
realities “imaginatively into the circumstances of the character’s past 
life.”231 
Laurette Taylor, a silent film star, described acting as “the physical 
representation of a mental picture and the projection of an emotional 
concept”232 and twenty-first century actor Tom Hiddleston offers that 
“[a]ctors in any capacity, artists of any stripe, are inspired by their curiosity, 
by their desire to explore all quarters of life.”233 Dana Ivey describes her 
acting process in words that could be used by a novelist or playwright: 
All creative people use whatever is going on in their lives in 
what they are creating at that moment whether they are aware 
of it or not. I’m not proud I use any resource that comes along. 
I’ll copy people. I’ll remember something I had for breakfast 
that gives me a thought. You never know when the “Aha!” 
experience is going to strike and you’re going to say “Oh, yes! 
That’s the way to make that work!”234 
After conducting a series of interviews with stage and film actors in the 
1990s, Janet Sonenberg concluded that acting “relies in part upon the 
creative application of the unconscious mind [and] cannot be fully 
explained,”235 that “[a]ll the actors strive to release the daring of their 
fundamental creativity,”236 and that her interviewees expressed “similar 
ideas” to Albert Rothenberg’s theory of creativity in the 1994 book 
Creativity and Madness.237 
Of course, there is an alternative vision that sees acting simply as 
recitation or “recitation+”: recitation with authenticity, recitation with 
sincerity, and other combinations. The director and playwright David Mamet 
                                                                                                            
230 Id. at 42 (emphasis in the original).  
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(1994). 
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seems to be a proponent of this vision of acting,238 although it is hard to 
separate his views on acting from his disdain for acting coaches and acting 
schools.239 Actors sometimes make statements in this vein,240 although even 
naysayers on actor creativity make statements hinting that copyright’s low 
threshold of originality is crossed. For example, Declan Donnellan urges 
actors that “[i]n a way, creativity and originality are none of our business,”241 
but does so with an almost Holmesian faith in the uniqueness of the 
individual actor: “Every actor who plays Juliet will see through a different 
pair of eyes, because each actor is a different and unique human being . . . . 
Whenever we try to be original, it is evidence that we have lost confidence 
in our uniqueness.”242 Even actors who intensely research their roles for 
verisimilitude243 do not seem to be doing anything different in terms of 
inputs to the creative process than the research of historical novelists or 
Disney Imagineers. 
Recall Google’s early argument in the Garcia litigation that an actor is 
a “creator of a work at another’s direction, without contributing intellectual 
modification, [and, therefore,] is not an author.”244 Reasonably understood, 
this presents a zero-sum game of artistic contribution in which the film 
director has all and the actor has zero. While not a zero-sum game, there is 
unquestionably a trade-off between the director’s artistic control and 
                                                                                                            
238 See generally DAVID MAMET, TRUE AND FALSE: HERESY AND COMMON SENSE FOR THE ACTOR 
(1997).  
239 Id. at 6 (“The Stanislavsky ‘Method,’ and the technique of the schools derived from it, is 
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Michael Stuhlbarg describing his amazing talk in the film Call Me By Your Name by saying, “I just tried 
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243 See, e.g., Gary Goldstein, To “Breathe” Again, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2017, at S8 (describing 
Andrew Garfield’s efforts to study speech patterns of polio survivor Robin Cavendish); Josh Rottenberg, 
One Actor, Two Heroes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2017, at E1, E6 (describing how, for a film on a legendary 
firefighting team, actor Miles Teller “underwent a grueling wild-land firefighting boot camp along with 
his co-stars”); Gary Goldstein, A New Way to Play George VI, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2017, at S30 
(describing actor Ben Mendelsohn listening to archival recordings of George VI and using a speech 
consultant for the King’s speech impediment); HAGEN, supra note 225, at 48 (describing an actor whose 
“background work occasionally went so far as going to live for weeks with families in the neighborhood 
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atmosphere of his character’s previous life”). 
244 Brief in Response to Suggestion, supra note 176, at 29 (citation omitted).  
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expression and the creative expression of the actor. And the relationship is 
complex. Addressing the director, Hagen writes “[i]f you believe your own 
[interpretation of a role] is definitive or the only one, you are not only wrong, 
but you will stultify the actor’s imagination and rob him of creative 
freedom.”245 For actor and director Andy Serkis, it is the director’s 
“prerogative to shift the performance to shape the narrative and tone, but the 
skill is to do that without in any way fettering what actors want to do.”246  
Indeed, the balance between the director and the actor is itself 
downstream from the trade-off between the scriptwriter and the director. In 
a scripted motion picture, the script constrains the director and both script 
and direction—that is, the director—constrain the actors. So if we believe 
that the director can bring “authorial” originality to the final recorded 
performance despite the script, it is not clear how we could say the actor 
cannot also bring “authorial” originality to the final recorded performance 
despite the script and the direction. As Richard Arnold puts it, “[t]he wider 
the margin of appreciation left by the text, the more likely it is that the 
director will qualify as an author. The more dictatorial the director, the less 
likely it is that the actors will qualify as authors.”247 In short, as long as an 
actor is not a mechanical or digital amanuensis for the director, there is space 
for the original expression that American copyright law protects. 
So what can we say on the bedrock question of whether the actor is 
merely an amanuensis for the director and the screenwriter? Is the actor just 
“the creator of a work at another’s direction,” or someone who contributes 
intellectual, emotional, or expressive “modification”?248 Initially, we should 
put to one side a couple of distinct fact patterns. 
First, there are many situations in which it is inaccurate to say that the 
actor “had no creative control over the script.”249 After they are cast, actors 
can have considerable impact on a script, whether it is Lily Tomlin in 9 to 5 
(1980),250 John Turturro in Barton Fink251 and Jungle Fever252 (both 1991), 
or Daniel-Day Lewis in Phantom Thread (2017).253  
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Second, even after the script is “complete,” there may be scenes in which 
the actors are invited to, expected to, or simply take it upon themselves to 
ad-lib—and that original expression is kept in the final film. Actor ad-
libbing includes: Bogart’s “Here’s looking at you, kid” in Casablanca 
(1942);254 Orson Welles’ take on European history in The Third Man 
(1949);255 Robert de Niro’s entire “Are you talkin’ to me?” scene in Taxi 
Driver (1976);256 John Belushi’s cafeteria scene in Animal House (1978);257 
eighteen minutes of Marlon Brando’s dialogue as Colonel Kurtz in 
Apocalypse Now (1979);258 the “What do you mean funny?” restaurant scene 
in Goodfellas (1990);259 and much of the dialogue in The Little Hours 
(2017).260 We can add to this list some of Bill Murray’s lines in Ghostbusters 
(1984);261 Whoopi Goldberg’s lines in Ghost (1990);262 Denzel 
Washington’s lines in Malcolm X (1992);263 and Jack Nicholson’s lines in A 
Few Good Men (1992).264 The director of Thor: Ragnarok (2017) claims the 
entire film was “80% improvised.”265 
In situations in which actors ad-lib or largely ad-lib their performance, 
the initial fixation of the dialogue constitutes the initial fixation of what we 
think of as the “script” in the same way that an authorized recording of a 
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jazz jam session can be the first fixation of both a new musical composition 
and a new sound recording.266 But no matter how extensive or brilliant the 
ad-libbing, Hollywood practice and collective bargaining agreements make 
it improbable that an actor would ever be given writing credit for a script.267 
But let us eliminate both situations in which the actor has significant 
input on the script prior to shooting and situations in which actors “write” 
meaningful portions of the script through permitted ad-libbing. Let us focus 
on what happens once the script is stabilized and filming has started. The 
Google argument was that actors are not authors because they only “create” 
the work at the film director’s direction and “the creator of a work at 
another’s direction, without contributing intellectual modification, is not an 
author.”268  
The creative process of shooting a film is often more collaborative with 
significant modifications contributed by the actor. Actor John Turturro 
describes one experience of working with the Coen Brothers this way:  
Because I played so many scenes by myself in Barton Fink, I 
absolutely needed Joel and Ethan to bounce off of. We would 
try everything one way, and then we’d experiment, trying it 
another way. They were excited because I was coming up with 
stuff that they hadn’t imagined. Because they worked very 
hard, I figured it was my job to truly understand what they 
wanted and to give them choices within their structure that 
they never even thought of.269 
While Turturro’s Barton Fink experience may be extreme, it is not 
unusual for actors to add expression to their characters that the director 
neither sought nor seeks to suppress (once the actor demonstrates the 
expression).270 Whether stage or film, one can think of the interpretation 
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control, and are perceived as controlling, the content of the script and the construction of the story”). 
268 Brief in Response to Suggestion, supra note 176, at 29.  
269 Interview with John Turturro, in SONENBERG, supra note 234, at 39.  
270 For example, the actor Betty Gabriel Georgina, who played a young black woman whose body 
has been possessed by an older white woman in the 2017 film Get Out, added “tiny physical glitches” 
inspired by old horror films and the idea that “not all the wires were connected quite right.” Lisa Rosen, 
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developed by the director and actors as a “text” layered on top of the text of 
the script.271 Matthew Sussman’s description of the experience of a theatrical 
understudy can also apply to film:  
[C]ertain vocal properties and physical gestures have become 
part of the text. For the understudy, two texts exist: the written 
word and the performance text the actors are doing each night. 
That performance text is like a transparency laid over the 
written text. There are comic or dramatic beats that have 
developed through the idiosyncrasies of the actor and his 
approach to the character, in collaboration with the other 
actors and the director. For instance, in the bar scene [in Angels 
in America], Roy talks about being family, ‘la familia,’ and 
then, just at the top of what looks like a hearty embrace, Ron 
mimed shooting Joe in the head with his finger like a Mafia 
execution. That’s a big laugh in the show. It’s not in Tony 
Kushner’s text, but the gesture, the laugh—the whole beat—
has become part of the scene. 272 
While Sussman was describing theater performance, the same happens 
when the actor uses an ad-lib line, adds a dramatic pause, or gives his 
character some physical tic that gets into the final cut of the film: the 
sequence of those dramatic performances is like a transparency laid over the 
film script.273 
Here it may be worthwhile to consider the different relationship between 
actors and directors in film and in theater. In the case of film, the director 
has significant control over the actor’s performance in post-production—a 
kind of control that does not exist in theater.274 The director can decide which 
among various takes to use, often using a performance that the actor might 
not consider her best.275 The director or the producer can cut the scene, 
slightly slow or speed up the performance, even running some frames 
backwards.276 This is a kind of control unimaginable to a theater director.277  
                                                                                                            
Making Each Moment Count, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2017, at S26. Christopher Plummer described his 
own process as going with “instincts” and “trying things.” Gregory Ellwood, The Contenders; Big Risk 
and Big Reward; A Half-Hour Drew Christopher Plummer into a Gutsy Gamble, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2018, at S29. 
271 Interview with Matthew Sussman, in JANET SONENBERG, supra note 234, at 153. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. 
275 See, e.g., Interview with Marcia Gay Harden, in JANET SONENBERG, supra note 234, at 175 
(describing how she gave the directors “many takes that had greater scope, shape, and emotion and lighter 
music,” but the directors chose a more “flat and stoical” take, choosing “the low, base tones” of the 
character). 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
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On the other hand, while theater directors have weeks of rehearsal with 
actors to produce the overall performance the director envisions, consistent 
anecdotal evidence from the film industry is that film directors rely more on 
actors to develop an interpretation of their character, sometimes with limited 
input from the director.278 For the film Fedora, actor Frances Sternhagen 
asked director Billy Wilder for time to discuss her character.279 Sternhagen 
reports, “[a]nd he just said, ‘You do what you were doing in Equus. You will 
be marvelous.’ He wasn’t going to tell me anything and so I just made my 
own preparations.”280 Kathleen Turner reports the same of director John 
Huston: “[o]n Prizzi’s Honor, John Huston used to say to Jack [Nicholson] 
and me, ‘Just call me when you’ve got it. We’ll come in and shoot.’”281 To 
echo Richard Arnold, the less the director is dictatorial and the more the 
director is collaborative,282 the more space there is for original expression 
from the actors. 
Nonetheless, one could still conclude that while “genuine human 
creativity” goes “into acting a script,” nonetheless “this creativity is different 
in kind and in degree from the creativity that goes into creating fixed, author-
driven works like literature and visual art.”283 This is the foundation for the 
belief—prevalent in civil law jurisdictions—that granting performers 
“related rights” or “neighboring rights” is a better approach than extending 
copyright to performers’ creative expression.284 It is worth reflecting on how 
“performance” originality might be viewed—or might have come to be 
viewed—as different from “authorial” originality.285 
In one sense, the creativity in a performance—musical or dramatic—is 
parasitic, or dependent on the creativity in the pre-existing musical or 
                                                                                                            
278 Id. (“In film, you’re expected to come in having worked out emotional transitions and character. 
I’m particularly glad for my training when I work on a film because it enables me, on my own, to find 
the truth of a scene.”). 
279 Interview with Frances Sternhagen, in JANET SONENBERG, supra note 234, at 183. 
280 Id. 
281 Interview with Kathleen Turner, in JANET SONENBERG, supra note 234, at 237. 
282 And “collaborative” is a word that actors frequently use to describe favored directors. See, e.g., 
Michael Ordona, It’s Their Turn to Shine, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2018, at S8 (quoting Academy Award 
nominee for best supporting actress Lesley Manville, who described Phantom Thread director Paul 
Thomas Anderson as “warm and collaborative and open”). Actors also talk about not wanting to be “over-
directed,” which speaks to the creative space the actor seeks to safeguard. See, e.g., Hugh Hart, Depend 
on Her to Get It Right, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 2018, at S4 (describing the working relationship between 
director Steven Soderbergh and actor Sharon Stone). 
283 Victor, supra note 67, at 86 (“[G]enuine human creativity goes into acting a script or performing 
a music composition, but . . . this creativity is different in kind and in degree from the creativity that goes 
into creating the fixed, author-driven works, like literature and visual art.”). 
284 In the traditional European view, “[p]erformance and interpretation are regarded as something 
quite different from authorship, and so performers are held not to have any role in the creation of dramatic 
and musical works.” ARNOLD, supra note 247, § 10.03 at 279. 
285 Id. 
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literary work.286 But that itself would not be enough to cordon off creative 
expression in performance from copyright. For example, editorial work is 
also dependent or parasitic. If that were the difference between types of 
creativity, why should selection and arrangement of Walt Whitman’s poems 
give a copyright to the anthology editor, but a recorded reading of Walt 
Whitman’s poems would not give a copyright to the performer? Why should 
a sufficiently original recorded performance of a public domain dramatic 
work not receive a copyright when a sufficiently original condensed version 
of the same public domain dramatic work would garner a copyright?  
Alternatively, the sense that there is a difference here may be rooted in 
a perceived difference between composition and performance. Discussing 
musical compositions and sound recordings, Robert Brauneis proposes that 
composition has been seen as a “deliberative activity that allow[s] rethinking 
and editing” while performance has been seen as an “unrepeatable, 
evanescent, . . . real-time, low-deliberation, no-editing activity.”287 
But such a distinction breaks down quickly. Brauneis has skillfully 
explored how sound recordings themselves became musical compositions—
with more specificity and detail than can be captured by standard musical 
notation.288 This is not too distant from Sussman’s idea that a successful 
theatre production has a “performance text” that is “laid over” the written 
script.289 And the distinction between a single work that is repeatedly edited 
versus repetition of action may better describe most literary works than some 
artistic works.290 A visual artist may do many sketches which are preliminary 
to a final drawing or painting, just as a performer may do many takes before 
settling on a final, satisfactory performance. Both the visual artist and the 
performer (musical or dramatic) may learn what works in those preliminary 
efforts. On the other side of the ledger, an artistic work does not lose that 
status if there was neither editing nor iterative expression. Drawings and 
even some paintings might be done in a matter of minutes; an essay or 
musical jingle might “pour” forth from a writer or composer in a short, single 
session. 
                                                                                                            
286 Id. 
287 Robert Brauneis, supra note 214, at 2, 8 (footnotes omitted) (“Composition—a deliberative 
activity that allowed rethinking and editing—produced a score, a stable, visually perceptible . . . set of 
prescriptions for musicians to follow . . . . Performance contrasts with composition in many respects. 
While a score is stable and visually perceptible, performance is unrepeatable, evanescent, and aural. 
While composition is a deliberative process that allows for trial-and-error editing, performance is a real-
time, low-deliberation, no-editing activity.”). 
288 See id. at 2–3 (describing the special nature of composition). 
289 Interview with Matthew Sussman, in SONENBERG, supra note 234, at 153. 
290 See id. (noting that an actor’s idiosyncrasies may become an important part of the performance). 
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IV. THE NON-PROBLEMS OF JOINT AUTHORSHIP AND ‘CAST OF 
THOUSANDS’ 
If we start with the premise that an actor may contribute protectable 
expression to an audiovisual work, does that lead inextricably to the Ninth 
Circuit’s “proverbial ‘cast of thousands’”291 problem? And keep in mind that 
that problem could take the form of either thousands of distinct copyright 
claims or thousands of claims to joint authorship.292 Some of the darker 
language in Judge McKeown’s en banc opinion suggests that fear of this 
problem could justify completely denying the possibility of protectable 
expression in actors’ performances.293  
Yet even after Garcia, worrying about “copyright of thousands”294 in 
audiovisual works is like worrying about snow in South Florida—perhaps 
we should have contingencies in place, but the arrangement of the world is 
such that the problem will rarely occur. To use the words of the Supreme 
Court in Qualitex, denying authorship to actors because of the “cast of 
thousands” problem would “rel[y] on an occasional problem to justify a 
blanket prohibition.”295 First, let us sketch out the existing filters—law and 
customary practices built on law—that almost always prevent the Garcia 
problem.  
After reviewing this familiar turf—and how those filters are likely to 
remain robust in the future—we will turn to how the “copyright of 
thousands” problem may have contributed to a troubled jurisprudence of 
joint authorship. While this is not the place for a full-blown exploration of 
what has gone wrong in the case law on joint authorship, it is important to 
understand why joint authorship in audiovisual works is not the scary 
outcome that it may have appeared to be to Judge McKeown.  
To the degree that courts have struggled to avoid judgments of joint 
authorship, they may have done so in the mistaken belief that a finding of 
joint authorship would require equal shares among the joint authors. But in 
situations in which the work-for-hire and implied licensing doctrines fail, a 
                                                                                                            
291 Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 742. 
292 See id. (foreseeing the problems of “[u]ntangling . . . tens, hundreds, or even thousands of 
standalone copyrights”). 
293 Id. at 743 (citations omitted) (“The reality is that contracts and the work-made-for-hire doctrine 
govern much of the big-budget Hollywood performance and production world. Absent these formalities, 
courts have looked to implied licenses. Indeed, the district court found that Garcia granted Youssef just 
such an implied license to incorporate her performance into the film. But these legal niceties do not 
necessarily dictate whether something is protected by copyright, and licensing has its limitations. As 
filmmakers warn, low-budget films rarely use licenses. Even if filmmakers diligently obtain licenses for 
everyone on set, the contracts are not a panacea. Third-party content distributors, like YouTube and 
Netflix, won’t have easy access to the licenses; litigants may dispute their terms and scope; and actors 
and other content contributors can terminate licenses after thirty[-]five years. Untangling the complex, 
difficult-to-access, and often phantom chain of title to tens, hundreds, or even thousands of standalone 
copyrights is a task that could tie the distribution chain in knots.”). 
294 Id. 
295 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 168 (1995). 
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greater willingness to find joint authorship with a quick determination of 
unequal shares might be a better solution. In contrast, if the case law makes 
the contribution of creative professionals—actors, directors, 
cinematographers—seem to “disappear” when there are no contractual 
arrangements, the jurisprudence will give unscrupulous producers a reason 
not to get rights and not to enter into contracts.  
A. The Filters that Prevent Both Copyright of Thousands and Thousands 
of Joint Authors 
Everyone agrees that there is a robust set of filters that, in almost any 
fact pattern, keep an actor from being deemed an author in an audiovisual 
work in which the actor’s performance is fixed. As Jay Dougherty noted in 
2016, actors being authors:  
[Is] not really a problem in almost every case because 
generally in films everyone works for hire. Maybe rarely it’s a 
joint work, but even if it isn’t, there is a possibility of 
assignment, and even if there is no assignment then there is an 
implied license in almost every case.296 
In other words, audiovisual performances are almost always governed 
by an express contract that links to statutory provisions ensuring any 
copyright interests belong to the film’s producers, and where the copyright 
interests fail to consolidate completely under the film producer’s control, the 
producer will almost certainly have some ownership interest or an implied 
license. But even this account starts mid-way in the various filters against 
the “copyright of thousands.”297 
1. More Than de Minimis Original Expression 
In both Garcia and Aalmuhammed, the Ninth Circuit was motivated by 
an overblown fear of “splinter[ed]” copyright interests. In Garcia, the court 
cautioned against views that “would enable any contributor from a costume 
designer down to an extra or best boy to claim copyright in random bits and 
pieces of a unitary motion picture without satisfying the requirements of the 
Copyright Act.”298 This is directly linked to a line of thinking in 
                                                                                                            
296 Jay Dougherty, The Misapplication of “Mastermind”: A Mutant Species of Work for Hire and 
the Mystery of Disappearing Copyrights, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 463, 466 (2016) (citation omitted); see 
also Diana C. Obradovich, Garcia v. Google: Authorship in Copyright, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 
792 (2016) (noting that the question of authorship or co-ownership rarely arises with motion pictures 
because of the work-for-hire doctrine, and because motion pictures are normally joint, not collective, 
works). 
297 See Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 743 (identifying the problems resulting from “[t]reating every acting 
performance as an independent work”). 
298 Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 737. 
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Aalmuhammed where, in its concern about who counts as an “author” of a 
motion picture, the court had observed that “[e]veryone from the producer 
and director to casting director, costumer, hairstylist, and ‘best boy’ get 
listed in the movie credits because all of their creative contributions really 
do matter.”299 
Of course, the costume designer already can have separate, protectable 
copyright interests; if the costume she designed is copyrightable,300 its 
appearance in a film is no different than a painting, poster, or quilt on a 
wall.301 As discussed above, the same might be true of hairstylists or other 
types of artists.302 But recognition in movie credits is simply not the same 
thing as recognition of a creative contribution to a film. Drivers, caterers, 
personal assistants to featured performers, best boys, casting directors, and 
lawyers for the production may be listed in closing “credit crawls” without 
anyone thinking they contributed original expression seen or heard on the 
screen.303  
Copyright’s bedrock requirement of original expression prevents most 
of these people from being in the universe of potential copyright claimants. 
In normal circumstances, the best boy—an assistant to an electrician on a 
film crew304—would not contribute any original expression to the film. It is 
the same with an extra in a crowded marketplace or battle scene: they 
probably contribute no original expression and, if they do, unauthorized 
reproduction would likely be de minimis.305 While a claimant might argue 
                                                                                                            
299 Id. at 742 (quoting Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
300 Many costumes will be analyzed under the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Star 
Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017) (holding that a feature on 
cheerleading uniforms “is eligible for copyright protection if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- 
or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work”). 
301 See Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, 126 F.3d 70, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
use of a poster of a quilt as decoration on a television set could be non-de minimis copying when the 
poster appears sufficiently in the television program). 
302 See supra Section II.C (discussing circumstances in which various types of professionals may 
produce copyrightable work). 
303 Conversely, the names of dancers and members of orchestras playing on the soundtrack—people 
who might make a creative contribution—are typically omitted, appearing neither in opening nor closing 
credits. 
304 Best Boy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/best%20boy (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2018) (defining “best boy” as “the chief assistant to the gaffer in motion-picture or 
television production”); Gaffer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/gaffer (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (defining “gaffer” as “a lighting electrician on 
a motion-picture or television set”). 
305 De minimis is principally used as a filter establishing a quantum for actionable infringement. 
See, e.g., Neal Publ’ns v. F & W Publ’ns, 307 F. Supp. 2d 928, 931–32 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that 
copying a few words and phrases from a human resources guide was de minimis); Werlin v. Reader's 
Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 463–64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (determining that duplication of two sentences 
from article was de minimis copying). 
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that what was taken was a substantial part of their original expression,306 
with audiovisual works, the de minimis doctrine has special application. As 
formulated by the Second Circuit in the 1997 Ringgold v. Black 
Entertainment Television decision: “In cases involving visual works . . . the 
quantitative component of substantial similarity also concerns the 
observability of the copied work—the length of time the copied work is 
observable in the allegedly infringing work and such factors as focus, 
lighting, camera angles, and prominence.”307 This variation on the de 
minimis doctrine has been used to turn back several claims of infringement 
in audiovisual works.308  
In short, the requirements that a plaintiff contribute original expression 
and that the appearance of that original expression cross a de minimis 
threshold knock out much of the parade of horribles envisioned in Garcia 
and Aalmuhammed.  
2. Work-for-Hire Doctrine 
It is not an overstatement to say that the work made for hire (or work-
for-hire) doctrine is “an essential building block for the movie industry,”309 
a building block consisting of both customary business relationships and 
statutory law that reflects those relationships. Codified in American 
copyright law in 1909 and re-codified in 1976, the doctrine provides that 
when the “work made for hire” conditions are met, the “employer or other 
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author” for 
purposes of copyright law.310  
 As Catherine Fisk observes, in the United States “[f]ilm and television 
production is a densely unionized industry”311 in which the unions 
representing actors, writers, directors, musicians, make-up artists, set 
designers, sound engineers, and more all engage in collective bargaining 
with television and film producers. It is fair to say the economic position of 
all these creative professionals was established early on more through their 
                                                                                                            
306 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 140, § 13.03(A)(2)(a) (“The question in each case is whether 
the similarity relates to matter that constitutes a substantial portion of plaintiffs work—not whether such 
material constitutes a substantial portion of defendant's work.”). 
307 Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997). 
308 Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that photos’ 
appearance in the background of the film Seven was de minimis); Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d 
922, 924–25 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the appearance of a dental illustration in an infomercial was 
fleeting, unfocused, and de minimis). 
309 Randal C. Picker, Garcia v. Google: Stanislavski and Meisner Pay a Visit to Copyright, MEDIA 
INST. (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.mediainstitute.org/2014/03/11/garcia-v-google-stanislavski-and-
meisner-pay-a-visit-to-copyright (“The work made for hire doctrine is an essential building block for the 
movie industry.”). 
310 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). 
311 Fisk, supra note 267, at 221. 
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collective action than through the clarity of their intellectual property 
rights.312 This collective bargaining system produces a robust baseline 
contractual structure for the vast majority of creative professionals in the 
audiovisual industry—a baseline contractual structure that relies on statutory 
work-for-hire provisions to consolidate economic rights with producers. 
Standard form contracting for actors in the audiovisual industry typically 
provides that:  
[A]ll results and proceeds of Performer’s services, including, 
without limitation, all literary and musical material, designs 
and inventions of Performer shall be deemed to be a work 
made for hire for Producer within the meaning of the copyright 
laws of the United States or any similar or analogous law or 
statute of any other jurisdiction and accordingly, Producer 
shall be the sole and exclusive owner for all purposes . . . . 313  
Similar provisions abound in the world of audiovisual contracts.314 This 
is not only how the statutory work-for-hire provisions are used in the 
audiovisual industry; this is also how Congress intended the provisions to be 
used. The definition of a “work made for hire” in the 1976 Copyright Act 
was expanded to include “a work specially ordered or commissioned for use 
                                                                                                            
312 For a discussion of the labor struggle of screenwriters, see CATHERINE L. FISK, WRITING FOR 
HIRE: UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, AND MADISON AVENUE 137–38 (2016) (outlining elements of writers’ 
efforts with the Writers Guild); CYNTHIA LITTLETON, TV ON STRIKE: WHY HOLLYWOOD WENT TO WAR 
OVER THE INTERNET 259 (2013) (recounting labor struggles of screenwriters in light of the emergence of 
streaming sources for television content). Much the same thing happened with live theater in the United 
States when playwrights organized and collectively demanded a more equitable economic relationship 
with play producers. See Jessica Litman, The Invention of Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1381, 1418–20 (2010) (discussing unionization of playwrights and ensuing developments with 
producers).  
313 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 140, Form 23-40 (providing also for the waiver of moral rights 
and their transfer to Producers “to the extent permitted by law”). In another standard form provided in 
the Nimmer treatise, the counterpart provision reads: 
Player acknowledges and agrees that all of the results and proceeds of Player’s 
services pursuant to this Agreement, including all material suggested, composed, 
written or performed by Player, shall be considered a “work-made-for-hire” specially 
ordered or commissioned by us and that we are and shall be the sole and exclusive 
owner . . . . 
Id., Form 23-41. 
314 For example, two standard contracts contain similar language covering “all results, product and 
proceeds of Writer’s services (including all original ideas in connection therewith) [that] are being 
specially ordered by Producer for use as part of a Motion Picture.” Writer’s Theatrical Short-Form 
Contract, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA WEST, ¶ 24, available at 
https://www.wga.org/contracts/contracts/other-contracts/standard-theatrical (last visited Sept. 24, 2018); 
see also Writer’s Theatrical Short-Form Contract–Writers Lending Agreement, WRITERS GUILD OF 
AMERICA WEST, ¶ 25, available at https://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/contracts/other-
contracts/shortformwriterloanout.docx (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (including near-identical language). 
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as . . . a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work.”315 The legislative 
history of the 1976 Act noted that “a motion picture would normally be a 
joint rather than a collective work with respect to those authors who actually 
work on the film, although their usual status as employees for hire would 
keep the question of co-ownership from coming up.”316 Some commentators 
are understandably critical of the work-for-hire provisions in American 
copyright law,317 but in the “densely unionized” audiovisual industry, in 
exchange for the transfer of ownership galvanized by work-for-hire, the 
guilds obtain minimum salaries and wages, “residual” payments, financial 
support for health care programs, protection of workplace conditions, 
control of credits or attribution rights, and more.318 
3. Implied Licensing 
When it comes to assignments, federal copyright law’s requirement of a 
written, signed transfer preempts any flexibility otherwise provided by state 
contract law.319 Perhaps because of this strictness concerning the complete 
transfer of rights, courts have been liberal in their interpretation of situations 
in which an author or other copyright owner has impliedly granted a non-
exclusive license for use of copyrighted material.320 Implied licensing is 
often coupled with the work-for-hire doctrine as providing a one-two punch 
to ensure that economic rights in audiovisual works may be exploited by the 
film producer. 321  
                                                                                                            
315 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “work made for hire”). Although actors’ contracts recite that 
their contribution is a “work made for hire,” obviously that takes us back to the problem of whether an 
actor’s performance is a “work.”  
316 H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736. 
317 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Authors in Disguise: Why the Visual Artists Rights Act Got 
It Wrong, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 741, 749 (2007) (“The work-for-hire doctrine perhaps can be justified 
when it operates to divest an author of copyright ownership given the economic quid pro quo she 
receives. On the other hand, by allowing an author to relinquish her authorship status and all that such 
status entails, the work-for-hire doctrine arguably undermines authorship dignity in a fundamental 
way.”); MARK HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM 127 (2009) (asserting that “nothing should or need be” a 
work-for-hire). But see Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive Justice, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 513, 567, 569–70 (2017) (discussing the positive economic effect of work-for-hire in 
transactions between companies and “creative professionals”). 
318 See Fisk, supra note 267, at 218–19 (discussing the functions of a union in the audiovisual 
industry). 
319 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012) (“A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, 
is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing 
and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”). 
320 If true, this would not be a unique case of courts creating work-arounds against strict statutory 
provisions. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 312, at 1403–10 (suggesting that courts sometimes recognized 
common law performance rights in dramatic works as a response to situations in which statutory 
copyrights were defective). 
321 See Picker, supra note 152 (“As applied to movies, the work-made-for-hire doctrine is designed 
to avoid the fragmentation of rights that might otherwise arise regarding a film, where any one person 
who did something in the making of the movie that gave rise to a separate work might be able to hold 
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The classic case in this area is the Ninth Circuit’s 1990 Effects 
Associates, Inc. v. Cohen322 decision. In that case, a special effects company 
agreed to create “footage to enhance certain action sequences in the film,”323 
and Cohen, the film producer, “agreed to the deal orally, but no one said 
anything about who would own the copyright in the footage.”324 Effects 
Associates delivered the special effects scenes, but Cohen did not pay the 
agreed amount, and Effects Associates sued for copyright infringement.325 
Following an earlier Ninth Circuit case, the court concluded that an implied 
license had been granted when “Effects created a work at defendant's request 
and handed it over, intending that defendant copy and distribute it.”326 
Today, there is no question that a non-exclusive license to copyright 
rights may “be implied from conduct”327 and Effects Associates is widely 
recognized as establishing a tripartite test. An implied nonexclusive license 
is created when: “(1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a work; 
(2) the creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and delivers it to the 
licensee who requested it; and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee-
requestor copy and distribute his work.”328 
With only slight tweaking, these requirements map onto an actor’s 
dramatic performance for an audiovisual work: the film producer requests 
the performance; the actor gives the performance and delivers it while 
authorizing its fixation by the film producer; and the actor intends that the 
film producer copy and distribute the performance. So, as Bill Patry notes, 
generally speaking, “[t]he correct approach to resolving the situation where 
an individual . . . contributes expression to a work but is found not to be a 
joint author is to find an implied license.”329 Indeed, the implied licensing of 
an actor’s contribution to an audiovisual work—as well as contributions of 
set designers, costumers, lighting, and cinematographers—finds strong 
support in the Berne Convention itself. Returning to Article 14bis of the 
Berne Convention, Article 14bis(2)(b) provides: 
                                                                                                            
out and block the distribution of that movie. And, even if the work-made-for-hire rules haven’t been 
implemented perfectly in a particular case, the usually generous rules regarding express or implied 
licenses to use copyrighted works will again make possible the distribution of the movie.”). 
322 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
323 Id. at 556. 
324 Id. 
325 Id.  
326 Id. at 558 (citing and discussing Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
327 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 140, § 10.03(A)(2).  
328 I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Effects Assoc., 908 F.2d at 558–
59); Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Shaver, 
74 F.3d at 776); see also Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 500–01 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying Effects 
Associates’ three-factor test in dispute over architectural drawings); FenF, LLC v. Healio Health Inc., 
No. 5:08CV404, 2009 WL 10688713, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2009) (applying Effects Associates’ 
three-factor test in a case where one company used copyrighted images of another on its own website). 
329 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:17 (2018). 
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[I]n the countries of the Union which, by legislation, include 
among the owners of copyright in a cinematographic work 
authors who have brought contributions to the making of the 
work, such authors, if they have undertaken to bring such 
contributions, may not, in the absence of any contrary or 
special stipulation, object to the reproduction, distribution, 
public performance, communication to the public by wire, 
broadcasting or any other communication to the public, or to 
the subtitling or dubbing of texts, of the work. 330 
The Berne Convention expressly allows that national law may require 
“undertakings” to contribute to an audiovisual work to be in writing, but that 
is strictly optional;331 agreements to perform may be oral or implicit and 
thereby impliedly license exploitation of the audiovisual work. The implied 
licensing approach only fell short during the Garcia v. Google case for those 
judges who believed that Youssef’s fraudulent representations negated step 
one of the Effects Associates test.332  
4. Will These Filters Remain Robust? 
Is it reasonable to expect that these multiple filters will remain robust 
going forward as audiovisual production and distribution evolves, or as the 
technology to produce high-quality audiovisual works diffuses to more and 
more creators? As evidenced through Garcia v. Google, one of the biggest 
concerns surrounding actors-as-authors is the audiovisual works on 
YouTube, whether we want to call them amateur videos or user-generated-
content (“UGC audiovisual works”). The concern is that YouTubers333 and 
other makers of UGC audiovisual works who are not “professionals,” are 
often just starting in their efforts (whether amateur or intended as a business) 
and are not in the custom of getting the types of written contracts that are 
                                                                                                            
330 Berne Convention, supra note 3, art. 14bis(2)(b), at 11. 
331 See id. art. 14bis(2)(c), at 11 (“The question whether or not the form of the undertaking referred 
to above should, for the application of the preceding subparagraph (b), be in a written agreement or a 
written act of the same effect shall be a matter for the legislation of the country where the maker of the 
cinematographic work has his headquarters or habitual residence.”). Article 14(3) establishes a 
presumption that this implied licensing regime does not apply to a film director, screenwriter, or 
composer unless “national legislation provides to the contrary.” Id. 
332 See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 937–38 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (“Youssef's 
fraud alone is likely enough to void any agreement he had with Garcia. But even if it's not, it’s clear 
evidence that his inclusion of her performance in ‘Innocence of Muslims’ exceeded the scope of the 
implied license and was, therefore, an unauthorized, infringing use.”), dissolved by, 786 F.3d 733 (9th 
Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
333 YouTuber, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES (2018), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/youtuber (“A person who uploads, produces, or appears in 
videos on the video-sharing website YouTube.”). 
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used in the film and television industry.334 So, the argument goes, a new 
industry may be thwarted by such rules. And certainly the salaries earned by 
leading YouTubers335 speak to the economic success for some UGC content 
on on-line platforms. 
Of course, if YouTube videos are an important new business, then it is 
fair to say that these audiovisual entrepreneurs should treat their employees 
and contributors reasonably. As a general rule, we do not exempt start-ups 
from minimum wage and other labor laws; we exempt neither start-ups nor 
hobbyists from environmental standards, sanitation laws, or building codes. 
Indeed, the claim that creators of UGC audiovisual works should not have 
to follow the requirements of the work-for-hire doctrine in order to be free 
from the worry of actors asserting rights sounds a bit like Mr. Cohen’s 
argument in Effects Associates that Hollywood film producers should be 
exempted from the requirement that copyright assignments be in writing 
because “[m]oviemakers do lunch, not contracts.”336 
B. The Rare, But Unfrightening Prospect of an Actor as a Joint Author 
In the extremely rare fact pattern in which none of these filters apply to 
the actor’s performance in an audiovisual work, we seem to be left with three 
possibilities: (a) the actor is the sole author of the audiovisual work; (b) the 
actor is a joint author; or (c) the actor is not an author at all. 
This menu makes clear the strange distortion of the Garcia v. Google 
case. A finding of joint authorship would not have helped Garcia and 
claiming to be the sole author of the whole film would have been 
ridiculous,337 so she claimed to be the sole author of something within the 
film, and the en banc majority opted to find she was not an author at all.338 
Similarly, in the Second Circuit’s 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin339 decision, 
film director Merkin disclaimed joint authorship in the finished film Heads 
Up and claimed to be the sole author of the “raw” footage—another 
untenable claim.340 The appellate panel found that he was not an author at 
all.341  
                                                                                                            
334 See Ginsburg, supra note 110 (“But producers of amateur films, including (especially?) those 
posted on YouTube and similar platforms, may not be the actors’ employers (indeed, the actors may not 
be professionals, either), and may be unaware of the need for written contracts.”). 
335 John Lynch, These Are the 19 Most Popular YouTube Stars in the World — and Some Are 
Making Millions, BUSINESSINSIDER (Feb. 2, 2018, 8:58 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/most-
popular-youtubers-with-most-subscribers-2018-2 (describing leading YouTubers’ salaries as $15, $7, 
and $5.5 million).  
336 Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556 (9th Cir. 1990). 
337 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 933. 
338 Garcia III, 786 F.3d at 737. 
339 791 F.3d 247, 255 (2d Cir. 2015). 
340 Id. at 252. 
341 Id. at 259, 261. 
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In both cases, the individual contributor disclaimed joint authorship, so 
neither court frontally addressed whether the actor or director should have 
been treated as a joint author. Maintaining the proper balance here is critical 
because the producer is the appropriate holder of consolidated economic 
rights in an audiovisual work. On the other hand, a finding of “joint 
authorship” for an individual contributor to an audiovisual work need not 
entitle that person to an equal share of any revenues from exploitation of a 
film. A joint owner may be entitled to a very small percentage of income—
or none at all.  
But the primary issue is whether an actor may have a bona fide claim to 
authorship of a “joint work”—that is, a work “prepared by two or more 
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable 
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”342 While this is not the place for 
a full critique of how joint authorship doctrine has developed,343 the 
jurisprudence applying this definition has become encumbered with judge-
created requirements that merit some discussion in relation to what actors 
(and directors and cinematographers) do in audiovisual works.  
1. The “Independently Copyrightable Contribution” Requirement 
Beginning in the 1990s, several federal courts recognized a requirement 
for joint authorship that “each of the putative co-authors . . . ma[k]e 
independently copyrightable contributions to the work.”344 The existence 
and nature of this requirement is now a well-known disagreement between 
the two leading copyright treatises.345 Paul Goldstein has advocated a strong 
form of the requirement, barring joint authorship unless each putative 
author’s “contribution represents original expression that could stand on its 
own as the subject matter of copyright,”346 a requirement that several courts 
seem to have embraced.347 In contrast, the Nimmer treatise has argued that 
                                                                                                            
342 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
343 See Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the 
Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 194–96 (2001) (discussing the legislative development of 
the definition of “joint works” or joint authorship); Michael Landau, Joint Works Under United States 
Copyright Law: Judicial Legislation through Statutory Misinterpretation, 54 IDEA 157, 158–61 (2014) 
(discussing case law interpreting the Copyright Act of 1976). 
344 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 
507–08 (2d Cir. 1991)). For other appellate decisions adopting the requirement, see Erickson v. Trinity 
Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068–71 (7th Cir. 1994) (adopting a similar standard in the Seventh Circuit); 
Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 64 (3d Cir. 2014) (adopting a similar two-prong test in the Third 
Circuit). 
345 See LaFrance, supra note 343, at 196–98 (summarizing the disagreement). 
346 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 184, § 4.2.1.2, at 379 (emphasis added). 
347 See, e.g., Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1070–71 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding the Act supports the validity of 
the Goldstein requirement); Berman v. Johnson, 518 F. Supp. 2d 791, 793 (E.D. Va. 2007) (using a jury 
instruction that questioned: “Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff’s . . . 
contributions to the documentary are independently copyrightable?”), aff'd, 315 Fed. Appx. 461 (4th Cir. 
2009). 
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a joint author need only make a non-de minimis intellectual contribution to 
the copyrighted work, a contribution which could include ideas—for a 
narrative story, ways to reorder scenes, plot points, etc.348 Judge Posner also 
aligned himself with this view, reasoning that one co-author might 
contribute “brilliant ideas but can’t write; another is an excellent writer, but 
his ideas are commonplace.”349 For Posner, such a collaboration would be 
paradigmatically “joint authorship” if that is what the two people 
intended.350  
In reality, any “strong” version of the independently copyrightable 
contribution standard may have given way to a more practical standard and 
there may be nothing in that standard to prevent an actor’s dramatic 
performance being a legitimate platform for a claim of joint authorship. 
Early on, Bill Patry proposed that the requirement ought not be taken at face 
value and should mean only that “the coauthor’s contribution must be the 
product of authorship, i.e., expression,” and not that “a coauthor . . . must be 
able to obtain a copyright on his or her separate contribution.”351 In 2015, 
the Second Circuit panel in 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin seemed to agree, 
noting that “[b]y ‘copyrightable’ [the Childress court] meant only to say that 
the coauthor’s contribution must be the product of authorship, i.e., 
expression.”352  
At the end of the day, a strong “independently copyrightable 
contribution” requirement would be incompatible with our common 
thinking about films.353 While the contribution of an actor might be 
imagined, or even shot, in isolation, there is no original expression from a 
film director or cinematographer that can be separated from what is done by 
other contributors. Yet in many jurisdictions, film directors are presumed to 
                                                                                                            
348 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 140, § 6.07(A)(3)(a). 
349 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Here is a typical case from academe. 
One professor has brilliant ideas but can’t write; another is an excellent writer, but his ideas are 
commonplace. So they collaborate on an academic article, one contributing the ideas, which are not 
copyrightable, and the other the prose envelope, and . . . they sign as coauthors. Their intent to be the 
joint owners of the copyright in the article would be plain, and that should be enough to constitute them 
joint authors within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).”). 
350 Id. See also Timothy J. McFarlin, An Idea of Authorship: Orson Welles, The War of the Worlds 
Copyright, and Why We Should Recognize Idea-Contributors as Joint Authors, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
701, 706 (2016) (“I believe that this rule—collaborators who contribute ideas, and ideas alone, cannot be 
joint authors of copyrightable works—reflects a fundamentally flawed conception of authorship, one 
which ignores the reality of the creative process and prevents artists like Welles from obtaining the credit 
and compensation they deserve.”).  
351 PATRY, supra note 329, § 5:15. 
352 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 255–56 n.3 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted) (“It 
seems likely that ‘[b]y “copyrightable” [the Childress court] meant only to say that the coauthor’s 
contribution must be the product of authorship, i.e., expression. [The court] did not mean that in order to 
be a coauthor one must be able to obtain a copyright on his or her separate contribution,’ or even that 
such would be possible.”). 
353 Id. at 255 (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507–08 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
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be the authors of audiovisual works.354 So, the requirement in its strong form 
makes little sense for audiovisual works and to the degree courts are 
applying a standard that simply requires original expression from a putative 
joint author, this creates no problem for actors or directors.  
2. “Superintendence,” “Dominance,” and “Masterminds”  
In its effort to quash the joint authorship claim of a consultant to Spike 
Lee’s Malcolm X, the Aalmuhammed court ran through multiple indicia of 
being an author, including that an author is: “the originator or the person 
who causes something to come into being”;355 “the ‘person with creative 
control’”;356 “he to whom anything owes its origin”;357 and “‘the inventive 
or master mind’ who ‘creates or gives effect to the idea.’”358 This emphasis 
on “control” or “masterminding” the creation of a work has no obvious 
anchor in the definition of a “joint work” or its legislative history.359  
If Aalmuhammed were limited to a requirement that each joint author 
act as “a ‘mastermind’ with ‘creative control,’”360 then perhaps the 
traditional range of principal creative contributors to a film could be 
included in the Ninth Circuit’s approach; that might resolve any 
inconsistency between Richlin—recognizing that an actor, a director, and a 
composer might all be joint authors of a feature film361—and Aalmuhammed. 
The problem is the wrongheaded thinking in Aalmuhammed that an author, 
sole or joint, must have “superintended the whole work.”362 On its face, that 
test bars from authorship of the film the screenwriter, the composer, and the 
actor—even when there would be no other actor in the film. 
The problem was made worse in 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin. There, 
the control criterion was firmly transplanted into the Second Circuit, which 
had not, until then, “proffered rules for determining which of multiple 
authors is ‘dominant.’”363 Since both producer and director arguably 
                                                                                                            
354 For example, in European Union directives, the director of a cinematographic work is expressly 
considered an “author.” See, e.g., Council Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006 on Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to 
Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property, 2006 O.J. (L 376) art. 2, § 2 (“The principal director of a 
cinematographic or audiovisual work shall be considered as its author or one of its authors. Member 
States may provide for others to be considered as its co-authors.”). 
355 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000). 
356 Id.  
357 Id. at 1233. 
358 Id. at 1234. 
359 LaFrance, supra note 343, at 224 (“Not only is the concept of a dominant author utterly absent 
from the 1976 Act and its legislative history, but is inconsistent with both.”).  
360 Blizzard Entm’t., Inc. v. Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co., No. 3:15-cv-04084, 2017 WL 2118342, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232).  
361 Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2008). 
362 Aalmuhammud, 202 F.3d at 1233 (emphasis added); Blizzard Entm’t., 2017 WL 2118342, at *1.  
363 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 260 (2d Cir. 2015).  
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controlled the “whole work,” the Casa Duse court essentially did a head-to-
head comparison of who had more control, finding that “Casa Duse 
exercised far more decision[-]making authority”364 and that the district court 
was correct in its determination that “Casa Duse was the dominant author” 
of the film.365  
The 16 Casa Duse language itself reveals the problem: if the inquiry is 
to “determin[e] which of multiple authors is ‘dominant,’” one has already 
conceded that there are other authors of the work. The requirement that one 
“superintend” the work as a whole or “master mind” the work unduly 
narrows authorship and eliminates too many creative contributors. As Jay 
Dougherty has pointed out, in the extreme the “mastermind” test for 
authorship slips into “a mutant species of work for hire basically based on 
the right to control.”366 A court considering an actor’s claim of joint 
authorship would be better to hone to the statute, the more reasonable 
approach in Richlin, and Congress’s clear intent. 
3. The Intent to be Joint Authors 
Finally, there is the actual statutory requirement: that the numerous 
authors have “the intention that their contributions be merged into 
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”367 The legislative 
history says that “the touchstone here is the intention, at the time the writing 
is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit.”368 
In the 1991 Childress v. Taylor decision, Judge Newman concluded that 
such a plain intention to “merge” contributions would not be enough—
otherwise the statute “would extend joint author status to many persons who 
are not likely to have been within the contemplation of Congress.”369 
Newman’s primary example was a book editor who “makes numerous useful 
revisions to [a] first draft”—both the writer of the first draft and the editor 
intend for the revisions to be incorporated into the works, but neither intend 
for the editor to become a joint author.370 For joint authorship to occur, the 
Childress court required the parties to “entertain in their minds the concept 
                                                                                                            
364 Id. 
365 Id.  
366 Dougherty, supra note 296, at 468. See also LaFrance, supra note 343, at 254 (“[The 
Aalmuhammed ‘mastermind’ test] would make work made for hire contracts largely superfluous in the 
motion picture industry.”). 
367 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The statute does not expressly say that all the multiple authors must 
have this intention, although that can be reasonably inferred.  
368 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 120 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (emphasis 
added). 
369 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991). 
370 Id.  
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of joint authorship.”371 Courts have adopted this interpretation of the 
statutory “intention” requirement with relatively little variation.372 
There has been little or no development of what it means for parties to 
“intend” to be “joint authors” or to intend “joint authorship.” But one does 
not need a PhD in psychology to know that “intentionality” can be complex 
and layered; what people “intend” has been subject to much more rigorous 
examination in philosophy373 or criminal law than in intellectual property. 
In the 1999 Holloway v. United States case,374 the Supreme Court concluded 
that “intent” in a criminal statute includes not just “unconditional intent,” 
but also “conditional intent”—what one is willing to do to achieve certain 
outcomes if certain contingent facts happen.375  
The Holloway holding may be limited to “intent” in that particular 
federal statute376 or use of “intent” in criminal laws,377 but it also points to 
some interesting possibilities: surely there are many circumstances—
perhaps most—where the intent to be joint authors is conditional, i.e., “we 
will be joint authors if you do your share of the work.” This is suggested by 
the Childress court’s observation that “[a]n inquiry into how the putative 
                                                                                                            
371 Id. at 508.  
372 See, e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring that 
the parties “intended to be joint authors at the time the work was created”); Nordstrom Consulting, Inc. 
v. M & S Tech., Inc., No. 06C3234, 2008 WL 623660, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing Erickson for the 
same proposition); Design Options, Inc. v. BellePointe, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(requiring each party to intend “that the work be jointly owned”); Papa’s-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 
921 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (requiring each party to “intend to regard themselves as joint 
authors”). 
373 G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 321–32 (1956–57) (discussing 
the philosophy behind determining human intention); see also LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS ¶¶ 197–205 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Macmillan Publ’g Co., 3d ed. 1973) (using the 
example of an intention to play chess). 
374 526 U.S. 1 (1999). 
375 Id. at 7. At issue was a jury instruction given by the District Court. Id. at 4 (“In some cases, 
intent is conditional. That is, a defendant may intend to engage in certain conduct only if a certain event 
occurs. In this case, the government contends that the defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily 
harm if the alleged victims had refused to turn over their cars. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant had such an intent, the government has satisfied this element of the offense . . . .”). 
376 Id. at 6 (“The specific issue in this case is what sort of evil motive Congress intended to describe 
when it used the words ‘with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm’ in the 1994 amendment to 
the carjacking statute.”). 
377 People v. Connors, 97 N.E. 643, 645 (Ill. 1912) (holding that a “specific intent to kill” could be 
found even though that intent was “coupled with a condition”); Beall v. State, 101 A.2d 233, 236 (Md. 
1953) (following Connors); People v. Vandelinder, 481 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) 
(following Connors); Price v. State, 79 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tenn. 1935) (following Connors). Section 
2.02(6) of the Model Penal Code provides: “Requirement of Purpose Satisfied if Purpose is Conditional. 
When a particular purpose is an element of an offense, the element is established although such purpose 
is conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining 
the offense.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6) (AM. LAW INST. 1984). See also Larry Alexander & 
Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1140–57 
(1997) (discussing the problems related to “conditional purposes”).  
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joint authors regarded themselves in relation to the work has previously been 
part of our approach in ascertaining the existence of joint authorship.”378 It 
seems clear that dramatic performers working on an audiovisual work do 
have “the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole,”379 but it remains an interesting 
question how one would measure intent to be joint authors for a dramatic 
performer. Would knowledge of recognition in a film’s credits—along with 
everyone else—indicate an intent to be a joint author? Recognition as a 
performer? Would an actor’s knowledge of “top-billing” (or “above title-
billing”) increase their sense that they were a joint author?380 Given all that 
dramatic performers think about their craft, it seems unlikely that the actor 
would think she is not an author.  
4. A Joint Author May be Entitled to a (Very) Small Ownership Share 
In approaching joint authorship claims in copyright cases, courts have 
assumed that a finding of joint authorship will mean that each joint author is 
entitled to an equal share of the financial proceeds, distorting joint 
authorship inquiries by creating both a high-stakes incentive for parties to 
claim joint authorship and a motivation for judges to find against such 
claims.381  
But nothing in the Copyright Act requires that outcome, and the 
legislative history indicates that that was not Congress’s intent. In the 
situation of a joint work, the Copyright Act provides that the “authors of a 
joint work are co[-]owners of copyright in the work,”382 and makes no 
mention of their respective ownership shares. The House Report 
accompanying the 1976 Act also lacks any discussion of ownership shares, 
but it clearly states that, “[u]nder the bill, as under the present law, co[-
]owners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common.”383 
                                                                                                            
378 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991). 
379 Id. at 504. 
380 Top billing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/top%20billing 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (defining “top billing” as: (1) “prominent emphasis, featuring, or 
advertising”; or (2) “the position at the top of a theatrical bill usually featuring the star’s name”). As one 
commentator explains, “[a]nywhere from one to three lead actors are often listed just before the title. It’s 
a similar position to the auteur, as the presence of these star actors is the reason many people came to 
see the movie.” Peter Bohush, Opening Credits: Who, What, Where, When, and Why?, 
NEWENGLANDFILM.COM (Aug. 1, 2012), https://newenglandfilm.com/magazine/2012/08/credits (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2018).  
381 See Benjamin E. Jaffe, Note, Rebutting the Equality Principle: Adapting the Co-Tenancy Law 
Model to Enhance the Remedies Available to Joint Copyright Owners, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1556–
57 (2011) (making similar observations). 
382 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012). The moral rights provision of the Copyright Act similarly provides 
that “[t]he authors of a joint work of visual art are coowners [sic] of the [moral] rights conferred by 
subsection (a) in that work.” Id. § 106A(b).  
383 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 121 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (emphasis 
added). 
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In interpreting the Copyright Act, courts have traditionally assumed that 
Congress intended copyright law to follow common law rules and 
principles,384 unless the statute expressly digresses from those rules and 
principles.385 In fact, within joint authorship, the duty to account appears to 
arise from common law principles; it is not to be found in the statute.386 So 
it follows that when Congress chose to impose the structure of a tenancy-in-
common on joint authors, Congress should be presumed to have intended to 
perpetuate common law principles for determining the tenants’ relative 
ownership shares for joint authors. And nothing in those common law 
principles requires equal shares among tenants-in-common. 
At best, the common law has a rebuttable presumption of equal 
ownership shares and that presumption is rebutted by clear evidence of 
intent, unequal contribution, or other circumstances establishing that equal 
ownership would be inappropriate. At common law, tenants-in-common 
simply “need not have equal shares in the property,”387 and there is abundant 
case law that unequal contributions by tenants-in-common to the purchase, 
development, or maintenance of real property will produce proportionate, 
unequal ownership shares.388  
                                                                                                            
384 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (“‘[W]hen a statute covers an 
issue previously governed by the common law,’ we must presume that ‘Congress intended to retain the 
substance of the common law.’” (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320 n.13 (2010))); Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738 (1989) (interpreting “employee” and “scope of 
employment” in Copyright Act “to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood 
by common-law agency doctrine”). 
385 This is just part of the broader interpretative canon establishing a presumption that statutes do 
not derogate from common law principles. See Samantar, 560 U.S. at 320 (2010) (footnote omitted) 
(“The canon of construction that statutes should be interpreted consistently with the common law helps 
us interpret a statute that clearly covers a field formerly governed by the common law.”); Astoria Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (citations omitted) (“[W]here a common-law 
principle is well established . . . the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an 
expectation that the principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’” 
(quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952))); Isbrandtsen Co., 343 U.S. at 783 (1952) 
(“Statutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of 
long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”). 
386 Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he duty to account does not derive from 
the copyright law’s proscription of infringement. Rather, it comes from ‘equitable doctrines relating to 
unjust enrichment and general principles of law governing the rights of co-owners.”’ (quoting Harrington 
v. Mure, 186 F. Supp. 655, 657–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1960))); H.R. REP NO. 94–1476, at 121 (1985), as reprinted 
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (“Under the bill, as under the present law, coowners [sic] of a copyright 
would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each coowner having an independent right to use 
or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any profits.”).  
387 2 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 426, at 213 (3d ed. 1939); see 
also RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 50.02[5] (Michael Allan Wolf, ed., 2009), 
LEXIS (“The undivided fractional shares held by tenants in common are usually equal and are presumed 
to be equal unless circumstances indicate otherwise.”). 
388 Ordlock v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 47, 88 (2006) (noting that the presumption that tenants in common 
have equal ownership shares “may be overcome by contrary evidence”); Anderson v. Broadwell, 6 P.2d 
267, 268–69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (holding that among three tenants in common, one was entitled to half 
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Against that abundant case law on ownership apportionment among 
tenants-in-common, there is quite little case law directly dealing with 
apportionment among joint authors.389 The rare, possibly lone case directly 
deciding this issue was the 1960 Sweet Music, Inc. v. Melrose Music Corp.390 
litigation in which the district court found that two joint authors of a musical 
composition were entitled to equal ownership shares of the composition 
despite the defendant having written all of the music and what appears to 
have been a majority of the lyrics.397 Despite unequal contributions to the 
creation of the work, the court found that “[n]o facts [we]re in evidence 
indicating that the ownership was intended as other than an undivided one-
half interest for each of the co-authors,”391 and that there was some 
evidence—a prior assignment agreement—for the parties to share in the 
profits equally.392 The Sweet Music outcome can be explained as the court 
believing the evidence of intent undermined the evidence of unequal 
                                                                                                            
interest in property because he paid half the purchase price); Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 879 A.2d 897, 903 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (affirming trial court’s use of differing financial contributions of each party toward 
the purchase of the property as a “particularly relevant” factor in its determination of equities between 
the co-tenants); Schroeder v. Todd, 86 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Iowa 1957) (“Proof of unequal contribution to 
purchase price of realty by grantees, in conveyance to purchasers of tenancy in common, overcomes 
presumption that they take equal shares, and raises presumption they intended to share in proportion to 
amounts contributed by each.”); Lemay v. Hardin, 48 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (awarding one 
tenant in common disproportionate share on the basis of the cost of repairs, improvements, or other 
property-related expenses unilaterally incurred by the tenant); Spector v. Giunta, 405 N.E.2d 327, 331 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (affirming lower court order distributing property interests in proportion to the 
contributions of each party, but remanding to allow further evidence showing contributions made for 
repairs and improvements to the property); Cudmore v. Cudmore, 311 N.W.2d 47, 49 (S.D. 1981) (“This 
[equality] presumption is rebuttable, however, by a showing of unequal contribution . . . [which] raises a 
new presumption that the grantees intended to share in proportion to their contribution.”); Huffman v. 
Mulkey, 14 S.W. 1029, 1031 (Tex. 1890) (determining tenant in common’s share by contribution to the 
total price of the deed); Cummings v. Anderson, 614 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) (“[W]hen 
in rebuttal it is shown that they contributed unequally to the purchase price, a presumption arises that 
they intended to share the property proportionately to the purchase price.”). 
389 See Jaffe, supra note 381, at 1556 (“[T]here is very little case law directly dealing with the issue 
of apportioning profits in an accounting action.”); A.E. Korpela, Rights and Remedies of Co-Owners of 
Copyright, 3 A.L.R.3d 1301 § 6(b) (2011) (“[Because of the] dearth of case law on the subject, there 
appears to be little source material for discussion of the basis for determining the shares of copyright co-
owners in accounting.”). Because of the lack of copyright case law on this point, it might be mentioned 
that in patent law, each co-inventor has complete freedom to use and license the invention without any 
duty to account to the other co-inventor(s). But this reflects a difference in the statutes. 17 USC §201(a) 
provides that “[t]he authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work” and the legislative 
history ties this to Joint tenancy and all that goes with it. In contrast, 35 USC § 262 expressly provides 
that “[i]n the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, 
use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, or import the patented invention 
into the United States, without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners.” 
390 189 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Cal. 1960). 
397 Id. at 659.  
391 Id. 
392 Id. (“The 1939 assignment, providing for advance royalties to be paid to Sweet and Grant, states 
that these royalties are ‘to be divided equally between them.’”). 
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contribution, but there are also statements in the opinion indicating the judge 
did not fully understand ownership shares in tenancy-in-common.393  
The idea that joint authorship requires equal ownership shares—what 
one commentator calls the “equality principle”394—is just a notion that pops 
up in dicta repeatedly with courts seeming to mistake “equal undivided 
interests in the whole work”395 for purposes of exploitation of rights to mean 
an “equal ownership share.”396 The better rule is the common law principle 
governing tenants-in-common: that tenants-in-common “need not have 
equal shares in the property,”397 and clear evidence of the parties’ intent or 
the parties’ unequal contribution can lead to allocation of unequal, 
proportionate shares. Proof of differing contributions in copyright joint 
authorship cases will not be particularly different than proof of differing 
contributions in real property disputes. Proof of intent to have differing 
ownership shares can also readily be part of the evidence before a court in a 
copyright dispute.398 Indeed, with musical compositions it is very common 
for authors to establish unequal shares in their royalties documentation.399 
Eliminating any irrebuttable presumption of equal shares could dampen 
the enthusiasm of some litigants to make joint authorship claims, but a 
court’s conclusion that someone is a “joint author” still gives that person the 
opportunity to license a work non-exclusively as well as to prevent exclusive 
licensing of the work. In short, these claims still pose both a substantial risk 
and a meaningful nuisance to film producers and others who consolidate the 
economic rights in complex works.400 In other words, a willingness to 
                                                                                                            
393 Id. at 657–59. 
394 See Jaffe, supra note 381, at 1550 (citation omitted) (“Furthermore, the courts’ application of 
the accounting remedy in copyright law has resulted in the conclusive presumption that absent an 
agreement to the contrary, joint copyright authors possess equal ownership interests in a work (the 
equality principle).”). 
395 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Joint authorship entitles the co-authors 
to equal undivided interests in the whole work—in other words, each joint author has the right to use or 
to license the work as he or she wishes, subject only to the obligation to account to the other joint owner 
for any profits that are made.”). 
396 See Jaffe, supra note 381, at 1550.  
397 TIFFANY, supra note 387, § 426, at 213. 
398 See, e.g., Janky v. Lake County Conv. & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“Similarly, she filed a document with the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 
(ASCAP) stating that Farag held a 10 percent ‘ownership share.’”). 
399 For example, colleagues at ASCAP report that it is currently very common for authors to 
stipulate unequal shares in their ASCAP documentation. As one example, a band may agree to apportion 
every main member in the group a writing credit, but give the song’s main writer the lion's share. Email 
correspondence with Mr. Sam Mosenkis, Vice President, Business and Legal Affairs, ASCAP, July 3, 
2018 [on file with author]; Email correspondence with Seth Saltzman, Senior Vice President, ASCAP, 
July 5, 2018 [on file with author]. 
400  NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 140, § 6.12(A) (“[I]n the present era of mass 
communications, use by one joint owner practically destroys the value of the copyright, and in effect 
precludes the other joint owner from himself using the work . . . .”). But because a joint authorship dispute 
is likely to be litigated after exploitation of the work is well underway, the threat embodied in a 
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recognize unequal shares among joint authors would correct judicial fears of 
windfalls to undeserving litigants without diminishing film producers’ 
incentives to get work-for-hire arrangements properly in place. 
CONCLUSION 
Among the different kinds of works eligible for copyright, audiovisual 
works are arguably the most complex, often involving scores of 
contributors—screenwriters, directors, actors, cinematographers, producers, 
set designers, costume designers, lighting technicians, etc. Some countries 
expressly recognize which categories of these contributors are entitled to 
legal protection, whether copyright, “neighboring rights,” or statutory 
remuneration. But American copyright law does not. Given that the complex 
relationship among these creative contributors is usually governed by 
contract, there has been—for such a large economic sector—relatively little 
discussion of authorship in audiovisual works.  
But glimmers of case law, pronouncements from the U.S. government, 
and commentary from scholars support the conclusion that actors can be 
“authors” under American copyright law. Indeed, any other conclusion 
would be inconsistent with basic principles of our copyright law. 
The Ninth Circuit’s 2015 en banc decision in Garcia v. Google is 
sometimes misunderstood as denying copyright protection to actors. But the 
Garcia decision was more about fraud and fatwas than clear conclusions on 
how copyright law applies to actors and acting. Stepping back from the 
strange facts of Garcia, the same principles that allow us to recognize 
copyright in a musician’s recorded performance of a preexisting musical 
composition should apply to an actor’s recorded performance of a script. 
Certainly, people in the acting community believe that their work is 
expressive, using the same terminology as other creative communities. 
Recognizing that actors’ performances are original expression subject to 
copyright protection does not lead inextricably to a “copyright of thousands” 
problems because of the robust mechanisms—both legal and customary—
that consolidate rights and permissions in a film with the film producer. On 
the rare occasion when those filters fail and we are forced to determine if an 
actor is an author of an audiovisual work, a finding of joint authorship need 
not be disruptive of a film producer’s successful exploitation of the film.  
                                                                                                            
declaration of joint authorship might be blunted to some degree. It might also be the case that joint authors 
should be declared fiduciaries of one another, mitigating any market-undermining actions. See Avner D. 
Sofer, Joint Authorship: An Uncomfortable First with Tenancy in Common. 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1998) (proposing that joint authors should be fiduciaries to one another). For a bolder proposal, see 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1015, 1055 (2015) 
(proposing trusts in which one joint author is “owner-trustee” with full managerial power, while all other 
joint authors are “owner-beneficiaries”). 
